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No Refuge: Hungarian Romani Refugee
Claimants in Canada†
SEAN REHAAG,* JULIANNA BEAUDOIN**
& JENNIFER DANCH***
From 2008 to 2012, thousands of Hungarian Roma sought asylum in Canada. Some political
actors suggested that their claims were unfounded and demonstrated that Canada’s
refugee processes were vulnerable to abuse. In contrast, advocates for refugees argued that
persecution against Roma was rampant in Hungary and noted that hundreds of Hungarian
Roma were granted refugee status in Canada. Much of this debate has occurred in an
evidentiary vacuum. This article fills this vacuum through a qualitative and quantitative study
of Hungarian Romani refugee claims. First, the context of the study is discussed. Then, the
article explores the experiences of Hungarian Roma within Canada’s refugee determination
system between 2008 and 2012. The article ends with concluding remarks, focusing on
particularly troubling findings from the study, including the impact of anti-refugee rhetoric,
institutional bias, inconsistent decision making, and problems related to quality of counsel.
Entre 2008 et 2012, des milliers de Roms de Hongrie ont demandé l’asile au Canada.
Certaines personnalités politiques ont prétendu que ces demandes étaient sans fondement
et ne servaient qu’à démontrer la vulnérabilité du droit d’asile au Canada. Par contre,
les défenseurs des demandeurs d’asile ont soutenu que les Roms étaient couramment
persécutés en Hongrie et que des centaines de Roms hongrois avaient déjà acquis le statut
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de réfugiés au Canada. Ce débat s’est déroulé en grande partie dans une absence de preuves.
Cet article comble ce vide en faisant une étude qualitative et quantitative des assertions des
Roms hongrois demandeurs d’asile. Le contexte de l’étude est d’abord discuté, puis l’article
détaille la manière dont le système régissant l’accès au droit d’asile a traité les Roms de
Hongrie entre 2008 et 2012. L’article se termine par quelques commentaires sur des faits
particulièrement troublants soulevés par l’étude, en particulier l’impact du discours
anti-réfugiés, le parti pris institutionnel, l’incohérence du processus décisionnel et certains
problèmes découlant de l’incompétence des conseillers juridiques.
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CANADA REVISED ITS REFUGEE DETERMINATION SYSTEM in 2012, dramatically

speeding up the process and limiting substantive and procedural rights for some
refugee claimants. These revisions include a Designated Countries of Origin
(“DCO”) scheme, whereby refugee claimants from countries designated as “safe”
go through expedited proceedings and have more limited access to procedural
rights, including appeal rights.1 Proponents argued that these revisions were
needed to crack down on alleged abuse of the existing refugee determination
system by “bogus” refugee claimants.2 Hungarian refugee claimants—most of
1.
2.

See Part II(D), below.
See e.g. Jason Kenney, “At a News Conference to Announce Royal Assent of the Protecting
Canada’s Immigration System Act” (Speech delivered in Ottawa, 29 June 2012), online:
Citizenship and Immigration Canada <www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/
speeches/2012/2012-06-29.asp>.
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whom were Roma—were held out as examples of this alleged abuse.3 Political
actors, including then Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Jason Kenney,4
noted that large numbers of Hungarian refugee claims were made in Canada
between 2008 and 2012, few of which succeeded and many of which were
withdrawn or abandoned.5 Hungary was one of the first countries to be designated
as safe under the DCO scheme, and subsequent declines in the number of
Hungarian refugee claims made in Canada after the system was revised were held
out to be an indication that the reforms (and the DCO scheme in particular) had
been successful.6
Many advocates for refugees, however, contest this story about Hungarian
Romani refugee claimants and abuse of the refugee determination system.7 They
point to evidence collected by human rights organizations of persecution against
Roma in Hungary, and they note that many Hungarian Roma have been granted
refugee protection on this basis in Canada.8 They also argue that the frequency
3.

4.
5.

6.
7.

8.

For a discussion of Hungarian Roma as an oft-cited exemplar of allegedly abusive refugee
claims in these debates, see Cynthia Levine-Rasky, Julianna Beaudoin & Paul St Clair,
“The Exclusion of Roma Claimants in Canadian Refugee Policy” (2014) 48:1 Patterns
of Prejudice 67.
Jason Kenney served as Minister of Citizenship and Immigration from 30 October 2008 to
15 July 2013. All references in this article to former Minister Kenney’s statements refer to
those made while holding this ministerial position.
See e.g. Jason Kenney “At a News Conference to Announce the Initial List of Designated
Countries of Origin, Whose Citizens Will Have Their Asylum Claims Expedited for
Processing Because They Do Not Normally Produce Refugees” (Speech delivered in
Ottawa, 14 December 2012), online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada <www.cic.
gc.ca/english/department/media/speeches/2012/2012-12-14.asp> [Kenney, “Deisgnated
Countries of Origin”].
See e.g. Chris Alexander, “News Conference Regarding Canada’s Asylum System” (Speech
delivered in Toronto, 22 January 2014), online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada <news.
gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=831769>.
See e.g. Rick Westhead, “Why the Roma are fleeing Hungary and why Canada is
shunning them,” The Toronto Star (13 October 2012), online: <www.thestar.com/news/
world/2012/10/13/why_the_roma_are_fleeing_hungary_and_why_canada_is_shunning_
them.html>; Gina Csanyi-Robah, “Protecting Roma Refugees: A Unique Perspective,”
The Canadian Jewish News (14 January 2013), online: <www.cjnews.com/index.
php?q=node/100453>; Kristen Shane, “Critics urge rethink of Hungary’s safe-country label,”
Embassy Magazine (23 April 2014), online: <www.embassynews.ca/news/2014/04/22/
critics-urge-rethink-of-hungary%E2%80%99s-safe-country-label/45444>.
See e.g. Roma Community Centre, “Roma Refugees in Canada and Bill C-31: Brief
Submitted to Canadian Government Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration”
(29 April 2012) [on file with author]; Kathleen Harris, “Refugee board approves claimants
labelled ‘bogus’ by Ottawa,” CBC News (11 July 2014), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/
refugee-board-approves-claimants-labelled-bogus-by-ottawa-1.2701153>.
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with which Hungarian Romani refugee claims are denied or abandoned is not
necessarily proof of abuse of the system and that this may instead be evidence of
flaws in the refugee determination system.9 Some go further and contend that
Romani refugee claimants fled persecution in Hungary only to be confronted
with similar mistreatment in Canada.10
Unfortunately, much of the debate about Hungarian Romani refugee claims
in Canada has occurred in an evidentiary vacuum. The purpose of this article is to
fill that vacuum by setting out the results of a quantitative and qualitative study
of Hungarian Romani refugee claims. The article begins by discussing the context
of the study, offering an overview of the historic and contemporary experience
of Roma in Hungary and outlining the history of Hungarian Romani migration
to Canada. This history includes two recent streams of migration by Hungarian
Romani refugee claimants and Canada’s response to these claimants. The article
then moves on to study the experiences of Hungarian Roma with Canada’s
refugee determination system between 2008 and 2012. Finally, the article offers
concluding remarks focused on several particularly troubling findings from the
study, including the impact of anti-refugee rhetoric, concerns about institutional
bias and inconsistent decision making at the Immigration and Refugee Board
(“IRB”), and problems related to quality of counsel.
Before moving on to the substance of the article, we would like to note one
point about the limited scope of the article and another about terminology. First,
in terms of limited scope, we would like to emphasize that the primary aim of
the article is modest: We hope that the evidence presented helps to better inform
debates about the most recent wave of Hungarian Romani refugee claimants
in Canada. Naturally, some readers may be interested in hearing more about
the implications of this evidence. For example, what does Canada’s treatment of
Hungarian Romani refugees tell us about Canadian refugee policy more generally
or about particular features of Canada’s recently revised refugee determination
system in particular? What lessons can be drawn about specific aspects of refugee
law, including tests related to the refugee definition? What can we learn from the
often-repeated castigation of Hungarian Romani refugee claimants as “bogus”
9.

See e.g. Cory Ruf, “A taste of tolerance,” UCObserver (January 2012), online: <www.
ucobserver.org/features/2012/01/taste_tolerance>.
10. See e.g. Bernie M Farber, Nate Leipciger & Avrum Rosenweig, “Hating the Jew, hating the
‘gypsy,’” National Post (25 September 2012), online: <news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/
bernie-m-farber-et-al-hating-the-jew-hating-the-gypsy>; Karl Nerenberg, “First they
demonized the Roma, but I did not speak out because I was not Roma…,” (10 December
2012), Rabble.ca (blog), online: <rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/karl-nerenberg/2012/12/
first-they-demonized-roma-i-did-not-speak-out-because-i-was-no>.
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about the relation between refugee policies on the one hand and political rhetoric
and media representations of asylum seekers on the other hand? What does the
recent experience of Hungarian Romani refugees tell us about the role of race and
racism in Canadian immigration and refugee policy? What should adjudicative
institutions learn from this experience in terms of how to deliver more consistent
decision making without compromising independence or leading to concerns
regarding institutional bias? What do the challenges Hungarian Romani refugee
claimants encountered regarding quality of counsel tell us about the relation
between access to justice and quality of counsel (in the refugee law context or
more generally), and what measures should be taken to improve both? In our
view, the evidence presented in this article raises all these questions and more.
While we do not attempt to answer these questions, we are confident that future
research will engage with these themes—and we hope that our study helps to lay
some of the groundwork for that future research.
Second, as far as terminology goes, this article is primarily interested in
Hungarian Romani refugee claims from 2008 to 2012. As discussed in detail
below, the large majority of refugee claims made by Hungarians in Canada during
this period involved Roma—but some were made by other groups.11 In the
article, we take care to clearly indicate when we are speaking about Hungarian
Romani refugee claims and when we are speaking about Hungarian refugee
claims more generally. We refer to the latter in several places either because we
are citing others who refer to this category or because we are citing data that is
broken down by country of origin but not by ethnicity.

I. CONTEXT
A. THE ROMA IN HUNGARY

The term “Roma” encompasses a range of peoples around the world who share
a common heritage originating in India.12 Many also share a Romani language,
with varied dialects.13 Romani peoples moved from India across the Byzantine
11. See Part II(C), below.
12. For general historical accounts of Romani peoples, see Angus Fraser, The Gypsies (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1992); Ian Hancock, We Are the Romani People (Hatfield, UK: University of
Hertfordshire Press, 2002); David M Crowe, A History of the Gypsies of Eastern Europe and
Russia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) [Crowe, History]. For an analysis of recent
evidence of a common heritage in India, see Peter Bakker, “Romani Genetic Linguistics and
Genetics: Results, Prospects and Problems” (2012) 22:2 Romani Stud 91.
13. Yaron Matras, Romani: A Linguistic Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005).
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Empire before entering Europe, where they have been present since the fourteenth
century or earlier.14 Historical documents describe Romani presence in what is
now Hungary by the fifteenth century.15
Today, there are large Romani communities in many European countries,
including Hungary. Population estimates vary, but it is generally agreed that
around ten to twelve million Roma currently reside in Europe.16 According
to figures collected by the Council of Europe in 2012, Hungary is home to
between the fourth- and sixth-largest Romani community in Europe, with
a population between 500,000 and 1,000,000 (or 5 to 10 per cent of the
Hungarian population).17
Unfortunately, anti-Roma persecution has deep roots in Hungary, as it does
in much of Europe.18 For centuries, this persecution has drawn on and perpetuated
stereotypes about so-called Gypsies, a label often imposed on, but rejected by,
many Romani communities.19 According to these stereotypes, Roma are nomadic
peoples who are reluctant to settle permanently and take up productive jobs,
preferring transient lifestyles instead. These stereotypes also take a variety of other
forms, ranging from romanticized and sexualized images of travelling ‘Gypsy’
musicians and fortune tellers to explicitly racist characterizations of ‘Gypsies’ as
criminals, beggars, and thieves.20
Such stereotypes not only gloss over the wide diversity of Romani communities
but also downplay the degree to which migration, precariousness, and transience
are related to centuries of persecution.21 As early as the fifteenth century, many
European countries passed laws expelling Roma from their territories and

14. Istvan Kemény, “History of Roma in Hungary” in Istvan Kemény, ed, Roma of Hungary
(Boulder, Colo: Social Science Monographs, 2005) 1 at 1.
15. Ibid.
16. European Commission, “EU and Roma,” online: <ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/
roma/index_en.htm>.
17. Council of Europe, “Estimates on Roma population in European countries” (July 2012),
online: <rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?docume
ntId=0900001680088ea9>.
18. Margaret Brearley, “The Persecution of Gypsies in Europe” (2001) 45:4 Am Behav Sci
588; Council of Europe, “Human rights of Roma and Travellers in Europe” (February
2012), online: <www.coe.int/t/commissioner/source/prems/prems79611_GBR_
CouvHumanRightsOfRoma_WEB.pdf> [COE, “Human rights”].
19. Ibid at 31.
20. Council of Europe, “Dosta! Enough! Go beyond prejudice, meet the Roma!” online: <dosta.
org/media/PREMS_45213_GBR_1490_DOSTA_TOOLKIT_A5.pdf>.
21. Dimitrina Petrova, “The Roma: Between a Myth and the Future” (2003) 70:1 Soc
Res 111 at 119-25.
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continued to do so well into the eighteenth century.22 Other countries went
further, passing laws enslaving all Roma.23 Hungary largely focused on strategies
involving assimilation—making Roma disappear as a community—rather
than on expulsion or enslavement. For example, in 1753, a decree prohibited
Roma from moving around the country, from owning horses, playing music,
or wearing traditional clothing.24 Further laws banned the Hungarian word for
Roma (Cigány), prohibited the Roma from intermarrying, outlawed use of the
Romani language, and ordered that Romani children be taken away from their
families.25 Migration was a key strategy through which Roma sought to avoid
such persecutory laws.26
European attacks on Romani communities continued in Hungary and
across Europe throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. They reached
an apex in the twentieth century during the Holocaust, given that Hungarian
Romani children as Porrajmos (“the Devouring”).27 Estimates of the number of
Roma killed by the Nazis vary greatly, ranging from 250,000 to 1,500,000 or
more.28 Irrespective of the uncertainty around the numbers, it is clear that the
Nazis intended to eliminate the entire Romani population across Europe.29 In
Hungary, the fascist Arrow Cross Party—which seized power shortly after the
German invasion in 1944—orchestrated the genocide against the Hungarian
Romani community.30 Thousands of Hungarian Roma were murdered,31 and far
more would have been killed had the Nazis won World War II.32After WWII,
the mistreatment of Hungarian Roma continued, albeit to a lesser extent, during

22. Ibid. See also Zoltan Barany, “The East European Gypsies in the Imperial Age” (2001) 24:1
Ethnic & Racial Stud 50 at 58; Vanja Ljujic et al, “Romaphobia: A Unique Phenomenon?”
(2012) 22:2 Romani Stud 141.
23. Hancock, supra note 12 at 21.
24. Kemény, supra note 14 at 15-16.
25. Ibid.
26. Crowe, History, supra note 12 at xvii.
27. See generally Guenter Lewy, The Nazi Persecution of the Gypsies (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2000).
28. Petrova, supra note 21 at 130. See also David M Crowe, “The Roma Holocaust” in
Bernard Schwartz & FC DeCoste, eds, The Holocaust’s Ghost: Writings on Art, Politics,
Law and Education (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2000) 179 at 197 [Crowe,
“Roma Holocaust”].
29. Barry A Fisher, “No Roads Lead to Rom: The Fate of the Romani People under the Nazis
and in Post-War Restitution” (1999) 20 Whittier L Rev 513 at 526.
30. Kemény, supra note 14 at 47-48.
31. Ibid at 48. See also Crowe, “Roma Holocaust,” supra note 28 at 193.
32. Kemény, supra note 14 at 48.
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the imposition of Communism under Soviet rule.33 Hungarian Roma were
not included in land redistribution, meaning they could neither own nor farm
on land of their own.34 Communism did provide employment opportunities
for many Roma, but Romani families were still much poorer than the average
Hungarian under Soviet rule.35
Since the collapse of Communism in 1989, anti-Roma sentiment in
Hungary has increased dramatically.36 Roma have experienced skyrocketing
unemployment rates due to workplace discrimination and the elimination of
many Communist-era industries in which Roma had predominated.37 Hungarian
Roma are also disproportionately subject to police enforcement activities.38
Furthermore, abysmally low education rates are especially worrisome39—though
these rates are perhaps not surprising given that Hungarian Roma children are
disproportionately placed in special schools and classes designated for children
with ‘mental disabilities,’ leading to de facto racially segregated schools.40 Other
troubling economic and social indicators for Roma in Hungary include massive
poverty rates, substandard housing, excessive reliance on government transfers,
poor health metrics, and low representation rates in political institutions.41
Roma in Hungary have also been confronted with mounting racist rhetoric
and violence, all too often with the support of the Hungarian political leadership.42
The European Roma Rights Centre has documented dozens of incidents between
33. Michael Stewart, “Communist Roma policy 1945–89 as seen through the Hungarian case”
in Will Guy, ed, Between Past and future: the Roma of Central and Eastern Europe (Hatfield,
UK: University of Hertfordshire, 2001) 71 at 86-87.
34. Kemény, supra note 14 at 49.
35. Ibid at 52-60.
36. COE, “Human rights,” supra note 18 at 13.
37. Andrey Ivanov, The Roma in Central and Eastern Europe: Avoiding the Dependency Trap (2002)
at 21, 31-37, online: United Nations Development Programme <www.undp.org/content/
dam/rbec/docs/Avoiding-the-dependency-trap.pdf>.
38. COE, “Human rights,” supra note 18 at 80-84.
39. UNICEF, “Towards Roma Inclusion: A Review of Roma Education Initiatives in Central
and South-Eastern Europe” (February 2010) at 12, online: <www.unicef.org/ceecis/ROMA_
PAPER_FINAL_LAST.pdf>; Christian Brüggemann, Roma Education in Comparative
Perspective: Findings from the UNDP/World Bank/EC Regional Roma Survey (2012), online:
United Nations Development Programme <www.romaeducationfund.hu/sites/default/
files/documents/bruggemann_2012_roma_education_in_comparative_perspective._undp_
bratislava_0.pdf>.
40. Ibid at 63-71; Horváth and Kiss v Hungary, No 11146/11, [2013] ECHR 92, 57 EHRR 31.
41. Ivanov, supra note 37 at 2-5, 47.
42. Amnesty International, “Violent Attacks against Roma in Hungary: Time to Investigate
Racial Motivation” (10 November 2010) 1 at 9-11, online: <www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/
files/public/rap_hungary_violent_attacks_against_roma.pdf>.
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2008 and 2012, in which Hungarian Roma were subject to racist attacks, some of
which resulted in deaths.43 Far-right extremist groups, including the Hungarian
Guard, have conducted paramilitary marches in Romani neighbourhoods
protesting “Gypsy criminality” while openly deploying Nazi imagery.44 Although
the Hungarian Guard has officially been disbanded, its former members continue
to undertake anti-Roma activities, and other organizations have quickly taken up
similar measures.45 Moreover, many leading Hungarian political figures support
both the Hungarian Guard and its replacements. For example, in 2010, the Chair
of the Jobbik party—an extreme right-wing political party with representation
in Hungary’s National Assembly and in the European Parliament—wore a
Hungarian Guard uniform to the swearing-in of the Hungarian Parliament.46 The
same year, the Vice Chair of Jobbik suggested that Roma constitute a threat to
public safety and should be restricted to living in what amounted to concentration
camps.47 More recently, Zsolt Bayer—a founding member of Hungary’s ruling
Fidesz party—said, “Most Gypsies are not suitable for cohabitation. They are not
suitable for being among people. Most are animals and behave like animals. They
shouldn’t be tolerated or understood, but stamped out.”48
Although some institutions at the national, European, and international
levels have taken steps to try to protect the human rights of Hungarian Roma,49
international human rights bodies and non-governmental organizations report
that the mistreatment of Hungarian Roma continues.50 For example, a recent
43. European Roma Rights Centre, “Attacks against Roma in Hungary: January
2008-September 2012” (1 October 2012), online: <www.errc.org/cms/upload/file/
attacks-list-in-hungary.pdf>.
44. Vona v Hungary, No 35943/10, [2013] IV ECHR 653 at paras 65-67.
45. COE, “Human rights,” supra note 18 at 48. See also US, Overseas Security Advisory
Council, Hungary 2014 Crime and Safety Report (14 March 2014), online: <www.osac.gov/
pages/ContentReportPDF.aspx?cid=15321>.
46. COE, “Human rights,” supra note 18 at 48.
47. Ibid at 42.
48. Carl Rowlands, “Hungary’s rabid right is taking the country to a political abyss,” The
Guardian (5 February 2013), online: <www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/feb/05/
hungary-right-political-abyss>.
49. For an outline of these measures, see Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms
of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Githu Muigai, UNGAOR,
20th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/20/33/Add.1 (2012) at paras 29-33.
50. Ibid at paras 34-41. See also EC, Parliament, European Parliament resolution of 3 July 2013
on the situation of fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary (pursuant to the
European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2012), 2012/2130(INI) (3 July 2013), online:
<www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P7-TA-20130315+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN>; Amnesty International, “Hungary: Murder convictions are
‘wake-up call’ over hate crimes against Roma” (6 August 2013), online: <www.amnesty.org/
en/articles/news/2013/08/hungary-roma-trial-verdict>.
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report by the François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights
found that, between 2008 and 2012, prejudice and discrimination against
Roma escalated and that hate speech and violent attacks by extremist groups
proliferated.51 The report went on to conclude:
Although the incidents provided very clear signals for taking action, the Government
response was inadequate to stem the rise in racial crimes and extremist action.
[…]
The fact that these acts have not provoked a strong governmental response has
emboldened the perpetrators and their followers, and has led to the perception that
such action is the preferred solution to a problem defined in racist terms.
In the last five years, the increasing tolerance of far right speech and activity against
the Roma in Hungary has led to institutionalization of racist political parties,
acceptance of paramilitary organizations, anti-democratic legislation, and police
indifference and impunity. These developments point to the heightened possibility
that Hungary is moving into a more violent phase.52

We agree with this assessment. While we acknowledge that the Hungarian
state has made efforts to improve the circumstances of Hungarian Roma, it is our
view that these measures have failed to stop the alarming escalation of anti-Roma
activities in recent years. As the following section will show, this ongoing
mistreatment in Hungary has prompted large numbers of Roma to flee and seek
refuge in other countries, including Canada.
B. HISTORY OF HUNGARIAN ROMA MIGRATION TO CANADA

Canada has been home to Romani communities since at least the end of the
nineteenth century,53 though the size of those communities today is not entirely
clear. In the 2011 Canadian National Household Survey, 5,255 respondents
identified as Romani.54 Census data, however, are notorious for under-counting
51. “Accelerating Patterns of Anti-Roma Violence in Hungary” (February 2014) at 42-43,
online: <fxb.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2014/02/FXB-Hungary-Report_
Released-February-4-2014.pdf>.
52. Ibid at 43.
53. See Ronald Lee, “Post-Communism Romani Migration to Canada” (2000) 13:2 Cambridge
Rev Int’l Aff 51 at 51-52. See also Claudia Smith, Gypsies, Preachers and Big White Bears: One
Hundred Years on Country Roads (Burnstown, Ont: General Store Publishing House, 1998).
54. Statistics Canada, 2011 National Household Survey: Data Tables (4 March 2014), online:
<www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/dp-pd/dt-td/Rp-eng.cfm?LANG=E&APATH=3&DE
TAIL=0&DIM=0&FL=A&FREE=0&GC=0&GID=0&GK=0&GRP=0&PID=105396&P
RID=0&PTYPE=105277&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=0&Temporal=2013&THEME=95
&VID=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEF> [Statistics Canada].
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Romani populations.55 The Roma Community Centre in Toronto offers a much
higher estimate of the Canadian Roma population, at around 80,000.56 Data on
the Canadian population of Roma with Hungarian heritage are even less clear.
One way to estimate that population would be to look to the 2011 National
Household survey, in which around 317,000 respondents identified themselves as
at least partly of Hungarian heritage.57 As we have seen, Roma constitute between
5 and 10 per cent of the population in Hungary, but it is not obvious that the
same proportion would hold in the Canadian context. What is clear, however,
is that Roma have long come to Canada as part of immigration from Hungary.
The history of Hungarian immigration to Canada involves intermittent
patterns of what would today be considered mixed migration: migration aimed
to varying degrees at escaping persecution (i.e., refugees) and at searching for
improved economic circumstances (i.e., economic migrants).58 Scholars have
identified several streams or waves of Hungarian immigration to Canada starting
in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and there are controversies over the
degree to which each stream involved refugees or economic migrants.59 This is not
surprising, considering both the complexity of motives that drive most migration
and the narrowness of the refugee definition. Under international law, the refugee
definition is restricted to those who have well-founded fears of persecution on
account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.60 The definition also includes a number of other
restrictions, such as the requirement that state protection against persecution

55. See Patrick Simon, “Collecting Ethnic Statistics in Europe: A Review” (2012) 35:8 Ethnic
& Racial Stud 1366 at 1385-86. See also Andrea Krizsán, “Group Self-Determination,
Individual Rights, or Social Inclusion? Competing Frames for Ethnic Counting in Hungary”
(2012) 35:8 Ethnic & Racial Stud 1392 at 1400-1401.
56. Christine Walsh & Brigette Krieg, “Roma Identity: Contrasting Constructions” (2007)
39:1&2 Can Ethnic Stud 169 at 173.
57. Statistics Canada, supra note 54.
58. For a critique of these labels (i.e., refugee versus economic migrant) in contemporary mixed
migration contexts, see Roger Zetter, “More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee
Label in an Era of Globalization” (2007) 20:2 J Refugee Stud 172.
59. See generally Nándor Dreisziger, “The 1956–1957 Refugee Movement in the Context of
Hungarian Immigration to Canada Since the Late 19th Century” in Christopher Adam
et al, eds, The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: Hungarian and Canadian Perspectives (Ottawa:
University of Ottawa Press, 2010) 194.
60. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137, art 1(A)(2)
(entered into force 22 April 1952) [Refugee Convention]. For a comprehensive discussion of
the refugee definition under international law, see James C Hathaway & Michelle Foster,
The Law of Refugee Status, 2nd ed (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2014).
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be unavailable in a person’s country of nationality.61 As a result, many people
seeking to migrate in order to avoid various types of serious harms—including
wars, collapsed states, humanitarian disasters, discrimination, and persecution
on grounds other than those specified—may not meet the refugee definition
even though they cannot be characterized reasonably as economic migrants.62 To
complicate matters further, some such migrants may qualify for various forms
of subsidiary protection63 or for humanitarian immigration programs64 despite
not qualifying for refugee protection under international law. Notwithstanding
this complexity, however, debates about Hungarian immigration to Canada often
come down to a simplistic refugee versus economic migrant dichotomy.
Perhaps the best known stream of Hungarian migration to Canada occurred
in 1956, when an uprising against the Soviet-installed regime in Hungary was
met with a Soviet military invasion.65 During the three-week uprising, Hungary’s
borders were opened and more than 200,000 Hungarians fled.66 Today, most
would be considered refugees fleeing persecution on account of their political
opinions. However, some were also likely motivated by better living conditions
in the West and so could arguably be considered economic migrants.67
At any rate, when the Hungarian refugee crisis erupted in 1956, Canada
had not yet signed the 1951 Refugee Convention and had no official refugee
determination system in place.68 Nonetheless, within days, Canadian immigration
officials were dispatched to Europe, regular immigration screening procedures

61. See Part II(D)(1), below.
62. For a discussion of the restricted refugee definition and the complexity of motivations
for migration, see T Alexander Aleinikoff, “From ‘Refugee Law’ to the ‘Law of Coerced
Migration’” (1994) 9:4 Am U J Int’l L & Pol’y 25.
63. For example, in some circumstances, Canada provides protection to people facing risks to
their lives or risks of torture or cruel and unusual treatment regardless of whether those
risks relate to the refugee definition. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c
27, s 97 [IRPA].
64. For example, in some circumstances, foreign nationals may acquire permanent residence due
to humanitarian and compassionate considerations falling outside the refugee definition. See
IRPA, ibid, s 25.
65. See generally János M Rainer, “The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Causes, Aims, and
Course of Events” in Adam et al, supra note 59, 12. See also Robert H Keyserlingk, ed,
Breaking Ground: The 1956 Hungarian Refugee Movement to Canada (Toronto: York
Lanes Press, 1993).
66. Ibid at 1.
67. Dreisziger, supra note 59 at 202.
68. Ninette Kelley & Michael Trebilcock, The Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian
Immigration Policy, 2nd ed (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) at 345.
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were truncated, transportation was organized, and over 37,000 Hungarians
ultimately arrived in Canada in less than a year.69
Canada’s rapid resettlement of Hungarian refugees in 1956 was an important
humanitarian achievement, and it helped to shape Canadian responses to
subsequent refugee crises.70 It is worth noting, however, that the government was
reluctant to offer resettlement until community organizations agreed to shoulder
most of the financial burden.71 Moreover, the resettlement efforts largely reflected
traditional national interests, including advancing the Cold War anti-Communist
agenda and fuelling the expanding Canadian economy.72 It is also important to
emphasize that, in a period of openly racist Canadian immigration policies,73 the
majority of those resettled were both Christian and white.74 Indeed, Canadian
immigration officials fretted about Hungarian refugees who did not fall into
these groups, including Jews who, in one immigration official’s words, were not
“bona fide” refugees but had instead “taken advantage of the situation.”75
Notwithstanding the racist attitudes of Canadian immigration officials at the
time, some Hungarian refugees selected for resettlement to Canada in 1956 were
Roma.76 Unfortunately, while Canada’s response to Hungarian refugees in 1956
has attracted substantial academic attention, little is known about Roma who
were included among this group, partly because many would have been reluctant
to disclose their ethnicity out of fear of discrimination and partly because Canada

69. Ibid at 346. See also Stephanie Bangarth, “Migrating Magyars and Canadian Inclusiveness:
Responses of the State and Voluntary Organizations to the Hungarian Refugees, 1956–1958”
(2007) 10 Eger J Am Stud 11 at 13.
70. Greg Donaghy, “‘An Unselfish Interest?’: Canada and the Hungarian Revolution,
1954–1957” in Adam et al supra note 59, 256 at 269.
71. Stephanie Bangarth, “Citizen Activism, Refugees, and the State: Two Case Studies in
Canadian Immigration History” in Catherine Briggs, ed, Modern Canada: 1945 to Present
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2014) 17 at 21.
72. Kelley & Trebilcock, supra note 68 at 346; Harold Troper, “Canada and Hungarian Refugees:
The Historical Context” in Adam et al, supra note 59, 176.
73. Canada’s immigration policies were explicitly racist until at least 1967, when formal bars on
immigration based on race were finally removed with the creation of the immigration points
system. See Kelley & Trebilcock, supra note 68 at 357.
74. Troper, supra note 72 at 190-91.
75. Reg Whitaker, Double Standard: The Secret History of Canadian Immigration (Toronto: Lester
& Orpen Dennys, 1987) at 67.
76. Lee, supra note 53 at 53.
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chose not to gather this information.77 To this day, however, many Canadian
Roma cite 1956 as a pivotal point in their family histories.78
After the 1956 uprising, the level of Hungarian migration to Canada
throughout the remainder of the Soviet period was modest. From 1959 to 1967,
approximately 300 Hungarian refugees came to Canada each year.79 From 1967
to 1984, an average of 400 Hungarians immigrated to Canada yearly,80 some
through family-reunification programs and others as refugees.81 Then, from 1985
to 1989, Hungarian migration to Canada underwent a small upsurge, with around
850 Hungarians—approximately 700 of whom were refugees—immigrating to
Canada each year.82 For much of this period, merely being Hungarian and outside
the Eastern Bloc countries was sufficient to make a person qualify as a de facto
refugee under a designated “self-exiled” class—though there were restrictions on
the number of persons admitted under this class.83 By 1990, with the end of the
Soviet period, concerns about economic migrants exploiting this class84 led to
its elimination.85
The key points in all of this are that, until the end of the Soviet era, Hungarian
Roma came to Canada as part of the regular streams of Hungarian immigration
and their ethnicity was seldom explicitly treated as relevant to how they qualified
for immigration to Canada. Instead, they immigrated mostly under the family
class or as refugees fearing political persecution at the hands of the Soviet regime.
With the fall of the Soviet Union, however, that quickly changed.
C. ROMANI REFUGEE CLAIMS AND CANADA’S RESPONSE: 1998 TO 2002

In 1994, within a few years of the end of Soviet rule in Hungary, Canada
dropped its visa requirement against Hungary. This meant that Hungarian
citizens could travel to Canada without obtaining prior permission from the

77. Levine-Rasky, Beaudoin & St Clair, supra note 3 at 74.
78. Julianna Beaudoin, Challenging Essentialized Representations of Romani Identities in Canada
(PhD Thesis, University of Western Ontario, 2014) at 118-21 [unpublished].
79. C Michael Lanphier, “Canada’s Response to Refugees” (1981) 15:1 Int’l Migr
Rev 113 at 120.
80. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Citizenship and Immigration statistics archives (1966
to 1996)” (5 June 2015), online: <epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-ef/
index.html> [CIC, “Statistics”].
81. Dreisziger, supra note 59 at 218, n 18.
82. CIC, “Statistics,” supra note 80.
83. Lanphier, supra note 79 at 117-18.
84. See e.g. David Matas, “The Self-Exiled Class” (1990) 9:4 Refuge 22.
85. Kelley & Trebilcock, supra note 68 at 396.
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Canadian government.86 Simultaneously, as we have seen, the mistreatment of
Hungarian Roma increased substantially in the post-Soviet period. It is therefore
not surprising that many Hungarian Roma came to Canada claiming refugee
status. Unlike in the Soviet period, however, they based their refugee claims
explicitly on persecution related to their Romani ethnicity.87
Hungarian Romani refugee claimants in the post-Soviet period arrived in
Canada in two streams. The first stream involved approximately 9,500 refugee
claims made between 1998 and 2002, representing about 6% of the total number
of refugee claims made in Canada during this period.88 At first, recognition
rates in these cases were very high: Around 70% of the approximately two
hundred Hungarian refugee claims decided on the merits in 1998 resulted in
grants of refugee protection.89 In the same year, all published Hungarian refugee
determinations involved persecution on account of Romani ethnicity, and all
were positive decisions.90
However, in 1999, in anticipation of increased numbers of Hungarian
Romani refugee claims, the IRB decided a lead case.91 Lead cases are tools for
enhancing consistency in refugee determinations by providing non-binding
guidance in cases involving similar facts.92 This lead case found that Hungarian
Roma do not face persecution and instead enjoy state protection in Hungary. The
decision was overturned by the Federal Court of Appeal (“FCA”) in 2006 due to
a reasonable apprehension of bias.93 Relying in part on emails exchanged within
the IRB and with other government agencies, the FCA found that
a reasonable person might well have concluded … that the panel … was not
impartial. This is because one of its two panel members may have been predisposed
towards denying the appellants’ claims since he had played a leading role in an
86. “Hungarian Visitors Won’t Need Visas,” The Globe and Mail (11 October 1994) A4.
87. See generally Levine-Rasky, Beaudoin & St Clair, supra note 3; Lee, supra note 53; Gerald
Kernerman, “Refugee Interdiction Before Heaven’s Gate” (2008) 43:2 Government &
Opposition 230 at 245-47.
88. Levine-Rasky, Beaudoin & St Clair, supra note 3 at 85. See also UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook
2002: Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions (Geneva: UNHCR, 2004) at 117,
online: <www.unhcr.org/4a07e87d6.html> (Annex 1, Table C.1).
89. Ibid.
90. Re MNO, [1998] CRDD No 36 (QL) (IRB); Re UPE, [1998] CRDD No 82 (QL) (IRB); Re
YSC, [1998] CRDD No 26 (QL) (IRB); Re HQW, [1998] CRDD No 30 (QL) (IRB).
91. Kozak v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 124 at para 10, [2006]
4 FCR 377 [Kozak]. See also Re ASS, [1999] CRDD No 1 (QL) (IRB); Re FNS, [1999]
CRDD No 2 (QL) (IRB).
92. Kozak, supra note 91 at paras 7-9.
93. Ibid at paras 58-65.
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exercise that may seem to have been partly motivated by a desire by [Citizenship
and Immigration Canada] and the Board [the IRB] to produce an authoritative,
if non-binding legal and factual “precedent”, particularly on the adequacy of state
protection, which would be used to reduce the percentage of positive decisions in
claims for refugee status by Hungarian Roma. The panel may reasonably be seen to
have been insufficiently independent from Board management and thus tainted by
the Board’s motivation for the leading case strategy. Support for a belief that the lead
case strategy was motivated by a desire to deter potential claimants is the apparent
leak to the Hungarian media of the negative decisions before they were released, and
the ensuing publicity calculated to deter Roma from leaving for Canada in order to
claim refugee status.94

In other words, the FCA found it reasonable to believe that, through the lead
case, the IRB was attempting to manufacture a negative precedent that would
reduce recognition rates and discourage Hungarian Romani refugee claimants
from coming to Canada. Unfortunately, while the FCA overturned the lead case
in 2006, the damage was already done. In the year the lead case was decided,
1999, Hungarian refugee claim recognition rates dropped precipitously (from
around 70% in 1998 to around 16% in 1999) and remained low for years
(around 25% from 1999 to 2002).95 The Canadian government also pointed to
these low recognition rates when, in a bid to reduce the number of Hungarian
refugee claimants coming to Canada, it re-imposed a visa requirement in 2001.96
Between the unfairly induced low recognition rates and the visa requirement,
the number of Hungarian refugee claims made in Canada plummeted from an
average of around 1,900 per year from 1998 to 2002 to an average of less than 100
per year from 2003 to 2007.97 Nonetheless, it should be noted that from 1998
to 2002, over 1,000 Hungarians were granted refugee protection in Canada.98
D. ROMANI REFUGEE CLAIMS AND CANADA’S RESPONSE: 2008 TO 2012

The second stream of Hungarian Romani refugee migration to Canada, which
is the subject of this article, occurred between 2008 and 2012. In 2008, due to
pressure from international trading partners,99 Canada once again dropped the
visa requirement for Hungarian citizens.100 As a result, the number of Hungarian
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Ibid at para 65.
Levine-Rasky, Beaudoin & St Clair, supra note 3 at 85.
Regulations Amending the Immigration Regulations, 1978, SOR/2001-525.
Levine-Rasky, Beaudoin & St Clair, supra note 3 at 85.
Ibid.
Jan Sliva, “Visa requirements must go, EU warns Canada,” Toronto Star (18
September 2007) AA2.
100. Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2008-54.
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refugee claims rose considerably, with over 11,000 Hungarians (or around 8% of
the total number of refugee claims made in Canada during this period) claiming
refugee status between 2008 and 2012.101 Statistics regarding the number of
claims made and the outcomes of these claims are discussed in detail below.
Suffice it to say that while hundreds of these claims succeeded, most did not, and
many were withdrawn or abandoned.102
Canada’s reaction to the most recent stream of Hungarian refugee claimants
involved troubling racial overtones. Hungarian refugee claimants during this
period, who were largely Romani,103 were regularly decried as “bogus” refugee
claimants.104 The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Jason Kenney,
frequently pointed to large numbers of unsuccessful Hungarian refugee claims
as evidence that the refugee determination system was vulnerable to abuse and
in need of reform.105 For example, at a news conference announcing measures
aimed at “discouraging [the arrival of ] those who are not refugees but [who] seek
to abuse our generosity,” Kenney stated:
[I]t’s cause for serious concern that the European Union, with its democratic
tradition of freedom, respect for human rights and independent judiciaries, has been
the number one source for asylum claims made in Canada over most of the past
three years. … [S]ince … 2008, we’ve seen some 6,000 Hungarian asylum claims
finalized … and virtually none of them turn out to be well-founded.106

Hungarian Romani refugee claimants were also accused of coming to Canada
to take advantage of social programs. According to Minister Kenney, Hungarian
claimants come to Canada not because they “need our protection” but rather “to
benefit from the generosity of Canada’s social welfare system.”107 He also told a
Senate Committee that Hungarian refugee claimants come to Canada because of
101.
102.
103.
104.

See Table 1 in Part II(B), below.
Ibid.
See Part II(C), below.
For an overview (and a critique) of this way of framing Romani refugee claims, see Petra
Molnar Diop, “The ‘Bogus’ Refugee: Roma Asylum Claimants and Discourses of Fraud in
Canada’s Bill C-31” (2014) 30:1 Refuge 67.
105. See e.g. House of Commons Debates, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, No 33 (26 April 2010) at 1205;
House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 40th Parl, 3rd
Sess, No 12 (May 4 2010) at 1535, 1620; House of Commons, Standing Committee on
Citizenship and Immigration, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 31 (26 April 2012) at 1535, 1620;
House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 41st Parl, 1st Sess,
No 46 (31 May 2012) at 1600.
106. Kenney, “Designated Countries of Origin,” supra note 5.
107. Ibid. Kenney was speaking about “EU claimants,” but this is a euphemism, as most EU
claimants during this period were Hungarian Roma.
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programs such as the GST rebate, the Child Tax Benefit, welfare, public housing,
and health care.108 As he put it, “[T]here is a wide series of benefits that people
can obtain, which appears to be a significant factor in that migration.”109 An
internal Canadian Border Services Agency (“CBSA”) report expressed a similar
view about Hungarian Romani refugee claimants, accusing them of “entering
refugee claims for economic betterment.”110 The report also states that “it is a
widely accepted assumption that many of these individuals are taking advantage
of Canada’s refugee processing system, social assistance, and other benefits.”111
Not only did government officials assert that Hungarian Romani refugee
claimants were fraudsters who came to Canada to abuse welfare and other social
programs, they also issued warnings about risks of criminality. For example, the
same internal CBSA report that said Hungarian Romani refugee claimants come
to Canada for “economic betterment” also suggested that Hungarian Roma
“are known to engage in petty theft, break and enter, possession of property
obtained by crime, fraud and forgery, and assault.”112 To whom exactly this is
“known” is unclear, but it is clear that such assertions both invoke and perpetuate
stereotypes about Romani cultures being tied to criminality. Other government
actors, including Minister Kenney, spoke frequently about crimes alleged to have
been committed by a few individuals in the Hungarian Romani community in
Canada and did so in a manner that implied widespread criminality within this
community. For example, in comments made to a Parliamentary committee,
Minister Kenney implied a connection between a criminal investigation into
human trafficking and large numbers of unsuccessful Hungarian refugee claims
made in Canada.113 The criminal investigation that the Minister referred to
ended up resulting in several convictions.114 There was intense media coverage
of the convictions, and the Romani heritage of the perpetrators was widely
108. House of Commons, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science
and Technology, 41st Parl, 1st Sess (18 June 2012).
109. Ibid.
110. Canada Border Services Agency, “Project SARA: International and Domestic Activities: Final
Report” (Ottawa: CBSA, 31 January 2012) at 7 [on file with authors] [“Project SARA”]. The
report was ostensibly about all Hungarian refugee claimants, but the report notes that most
such claimants are Romani (ibid at 5).
111. Ibid at 12.
112. Ibid at 7.
113. House of Commons Debates, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, No 36 (29 April 2010) at 1110.
114. “Court hands out toughest Canadian sentence yet for human trafficking,” National Post (4
April 2012) A6. See also “Canada deports 20 members of Hungarian human trafficking
ring,” Toronto Star (22 July 2014), online: <www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/07/22/
canada_deports_20_members_of_hungarian_human_trafficking_ring.html>.
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cited, yet the fact that most victims of the crime were vulnerable because they
were seeking to escape anti-Roma mistreatment in their home country was not
widely discussed.115
In May 2012, Gina Csanyi-Robah, Executive Director of the Roma
Community Centre in Toronto, pleaded with a Parliamentary committee to reject
the way that the most recent stream of Hungarian Roma were being presented
by government officials and by the media, warning that anti-Roma rhetoric was
making its way to Canada:
Don’t believe the stereotypes about us that we’re criminals. … There was one case
in Hamilton with 20 people involved. … There have been Roma living in Canada
for over 100 years. There are over 80,000 of us. … One case cannot represent … an
entire community of people. It’s racism.
[…]
In Canada, we’re still talking about bogus refugees, criminals, and people living
off the welfare system. When people legitimately need help in Canada, they are
being doubly victimized. They’re being told to get out of Hungary. They’re being
told that Hungary is for Hungarians—ethnic Magyars. After longer than Canada
has been a country, they are told to get out.... They come here and people are, like,
“You’re criminals”. It’s the same rhetoric, the same discourse, that’s happening in
these European societies, and we’re allowing it to come here.116

Unfortunately, these last remarks proved to be especially prescient. On 5
September 2012, in a television segment on the Sun News Network, conservative
pundit Ezra Levant went on a viciously racist tirade against Hungarian Romani
refugee claimants, deploying all the standard anti-Roma rhetoric:
I told you about the wave of fraudulent refugee claims made by Gypsies trying to
lie their way into Canada. … I mean, they’re coming from Hungary, for crying out
loud, a rich, generous, liberal democracy. No one’s a refugee from Hungary […] .
But these are Gypsies, a culture synonymous with swindlers. The phrase “Gypsy”
and “cheater” have been [so] interchangeable historically that the word has entered
the English language as a verb—he “gypped” me.
Well, the Gypsies have gypped us. Too many have come here as false refugees. And
they come here to gyp us again, to rob us blind as they have done in Europe for
centuries […] .
115. For an analysis of the media coverage of this incident, including a finding that 70 per cent
of all negative headlines from Roma-focused articles in 2012 focused on this single criminal
case, see Beaudoin, supra note 78 at 195.
116. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 41st Parl, 1st Sess,
No 39 (3 May 2012) at 1815 [emphasis added].
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The Gypsies aren’t a race, they aren’t a religion, they aren’t a linguistic group. They’re
… a shiftless group of hoboes […] .
For centuries, these roving highway gangs have mocked the law and robbed their
way across Europe. Now, because of our broken refugee system, they’re here in
Canada by the thousands and they’ve brought a Gypsy crime wave with them.117

In our view, all of this—the dire warnings about large influxes of Hungarian
Roma allegedly involving widespread abuse of Canadian generosity as well as
welfare fraud and criminality—links directly to racial stereotypes that have
been prevalent in Europe for centuries, which is to say stereotypes about Roma
as beggars, criminals, and thieves. As such, the reactions to the latest wave of
Hungarian Romani refugee claimants in Canada can be understood as a kind of
racial panic.118
The reactions can also be understood as part of a broader phenomenon
of retrenchment from Canada’s obligations under international refugee law,
particularly with regard to so-called self-selected refugees.119 Over the past several
decades, political actors have increasingly deployed a ‘good refugee’ (i.e., genuine
refugee) versus ‘bad refugee’ (i.e., illegal economic migrant) dichotomy.120
According to this view, ‘good refugees’ are those who wait patiently in refugee
117. D Ish et al, “Sun News Network re The Source (Theft Ring)” (9 September 2013), online:
Canadian Broadcast Standards Council <www.cbsc.ca/sun-news-network-re-the-source-theftring>. The Canadian Broadcast Standards Council condemned the segment for breaching
a large number of broadcasting standards, including norms against “abusive or unduly
discriminatory material or comment which is based on matters of race, national or ethnic
origin” (ibid).
118. This is not a new phenomenon. For an analysis of a similar racial panic regarding prior
groups of migrants, see Sherene H Razack, “Making Canada White: Law and the Policing of
Bodies of Colour in the 1990s” (1999) 14:1 CJLS 159.
119. For a general discussion of Canada’s retrenchment for respect for the human rights
of refugees, see Efrat Arbel & Alletta Brenner, “Bordering on Failure: Canada-U.S.
Border Policy and the Politics of Refugee Exclusion” (November 2013), online: Harvard
Immigration and Refugee Law Clinical Program <harvardimmigrationclinic.files.wordpress.
com/2013/11/bordering-on-failure-harvard-immigration-and-refugee-law-clinical-program1.
pdf>; Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration
and Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Donald Galloway, “Rights and the
re-identified refugee: an analysis of recent shifts in Canadian law” in Susan Kneebone, Dallal
Stevens & Loretta Baldassar, Refugee Protection and the Role of Law: Conflicting Identifies
(Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2014) 36.
120. For discussions of this dichotomy, see Alison Mountz, “Human Smuggling, the Transnational
Imaginary, and Everyday Geographies of the Nation-State” (2003) 35:3 Antipode 622;
Audrey Macklin, “Disappearing Refugees: Reflections on the Canada-U.S. Safe Third
Country Agreement” (2005) 36 Colum HRL Rev 365 [Macklin, “Disappearing”]. See also
Diop, supra note 104.
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camps abroad and who are selected for resettlement to Canada either through
government or private sponsorship programs. ‘Bad refugees’ by contrast are
those who come to the country uninvited and take advantage of Canada’s inland
refugee claim system to ‘jump the queue.’ To get to Canada—and specifically
to evade interdiction mechanisms that Canada uses to prevent refugees from
gaining access to Canadian territory and thereby to Canada’s inland refugee
determination system—‘bad refugees’ often use false documents or the services
of human smugglers. As a result, ‘bad refugees’ are regularly associated with
criminality. At the same time, claimants who come from countries for which
interdiction strategies are unworkable—for example, countries where the
economic and political costs of imposing visa restrictions are very high—are
typically constructed as fraudsters, often by pointing to examples of claims that
were denied from that country. Regardless of the specific reasons for denial, these
‘bad refugees’ are regularly called “bogus” and associated with fraud. Audrey
Macklin terms this phenomenon the discursive disappearance of refugees.121
This discursive disappearance of refugees has been accompanied by policies that
literally make refugees disappear, as the Canadian state has increasingly sought
to crack down on ‘bad refugees,’ either by creating new mechanisms to prevent
their arrival in Canada or by establishing harsh policies to discourage them from
coming to the country in the first place.122 The result is that in a period where the
number of refugees around the world is at a decades long high, the number of
asylum seekers arriving in Canada is lower than it has been in many years.123 The
response to Hungarian Roma—who have been presented as archetypical ‘bad
refugees’—can be understood as one instance of this broader phenomenon.

121. “Disappearing,” supra note 120.
122. Ibid. See also Diop, supra note 104; Janet Dench & François Crépeau, “Interdiction at the
Expense of Human Rights: A Long-term Containment Strategy” (2003) 21:4 Refuge 2;
Andrew Brouwer and Judith Kumin, “Interception and Asylum: When Migration Control
and Human Rights Collide” (2003) 21:4 Refuge 6.
123. For example, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, by the end
of 2013, the number of people forcibly displaced around the world was at the highest level
in more than five decades. See UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2013 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2014)
at 6, online: <www.unhcr.org/54cf9bd69.html>. In the same year, Canada received 10,356
applications for refugee protection (ibid at 104). During the prior fifteen years, the number
of claims in Canada ranged from a high of 44,038 in 2001 to a low of 20,223 in 2012. See
UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2001: Refugees, Asylum-seekers and Other Persons of Concern Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions (Geneva: UNHCR, 2002) at 113, online:
<www.unhcr.org/4a02e3406.html>. See also UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2012 (Geneva:
UNHCR, 2013) at 97, online: <www.unhcr.org/52a7213b9.html>.
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At any rate, regardless of how the reaction to the arrival of Hungarian Romani
refugee claimants ought to be understood, what matters for our purposes is that,
as early as 2010, the government was actively seeking out measures to deter
further Hungarian Roma from seeking refugee protection in Canada. Various
options were considered. Re-imposing the visa requirement was put forward as
a possibility,124 but this proved not to be viable in light of negotiations regarding
a free trade deal between Canada and the European Union (“EU”).125 Another
option reportedly considered was the mass detention of Hungarian Romani
refugee claimants pending the determination of their claims.126
Ultimately, the measure selected by the government to, among other things,
deter the arrival of Hungarian Romani refugee claimants was to reform Canada’s
refugee determination system.127 The new system, which came into effect in
December 2012,128 purportedly aims to discourage unfounded refugee claims
by speeding up the process and by limiting the procedural and substantive rights
124. See e.g. “Project SARA,” supra note 110 at 54-55; Heather Scoffield, “Visa clampdown near
for Hungarian visitors; Ottawa considers move to stem a rising tide of refugee applications,”
Toronto Star (9 January 2010) A8; Peter O’Neil, “Hungary visa restrictions not ruled out,
minister says,” National Post (7 September 2010) A4.
125. See e.g. Anca Gurzu, “Visas to once again top Canada-EU agenda,” Embassy (5 May 2010),
online: <www.embassynews.ca/news/2010/05/05/visas-to-once-again-top-canada-euagenda/38889>; Bruce Campion-Smith, “Visa spat threatens Canada-EU trade deal,” Toronto
Star (27 April 2012) B1.
126. “Federal government mulls detaining Roma refugee claimants,” CBC News (18 August
2012), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/federal-government-mulls-detaining-romarefugee-claimants-1.1271996>. In 2012, Canada’s immigration legislation was revised to
allow the government to designate groups of irregular arrivals to Canada as “designated
foreign nationals.” One consequence of designation is automatic detention with limited
opportunities for any kind of review. See IRPA, supra note 63, ss 20.1, 55(3.1). Tellingly, the
only groups that have thus far been designated have been Roma. See Wilson Ring & Rob
Gillies, “Canada targets Romanians smuggling Gypsies,” Yahoo News (5 December 2012),
online: <news.yahoo.com/canada-targets-romanians-smuggling-gypsies-013031013.html>
127. Balanced Refugee Reform Act, SC 2010, c 8; Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, SC
2012, c 17. For an overview of the revised refugee determination system, see Jacqueline
Swaisland & Lorne Waldman, Canada’s Refugee Determination Procedure: A Guide for the
Post Bill C-31 Era (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis, 2013). For explicit links between these
reforms and Hungarian refugee claims, see “Project SARA,” supra note 110 at 55. See also
Part II(H), below.
128. Order Fixing December 15, 2012 as the Day on which Certain Sections of the Act Come into
Force, SI/2012-94, (2012) C Gaz II, 2980 (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act); Order
Fixing December 15, 2012 as the Day on which Certain Sections of the Act Come into Force,
SI/2012-95, (2012) C Gaz II, 2982 (Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act); Order
fixing December 15, 2012 as the Day on which Certain Sections of the Act Come into Force,
SI/2012-96, (2012) C Gaz II, 2984 (Balanced Refugee Reform Act).
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of various groups of refugee claimants, including claimants from Designated
Countries of Origin (“DCO”).129 Under the new system, claimants from DCOs
are subject to expedited refugee claim processing timelines,130 cannot appeal
negative refugee determinations to the Refugee Appeal Division of the IRB,131
do not benefit from an automatic stay on removal pending Federal Court review
of their refugee determinations,132 and are subject to restrictions on access to
Pre-Removal Risk Assessments (a pre-deportation procedure to assess new risks
that have arisen since the time of a person’s refugee claim).133 They are also
denied access to publicly funded health care, even while their refugee claims
are pending.134 Similarly, DCO claimants are ineligible for work permits,135 and
recent legislation has authorized provinces to deny social assistance to refugee
claimants.136 To no one’s surprise, Hungary was one of the first countries to be
listed as a DCO. Thus, Hungarian Romani refugee claimants are now subject to
all of these limitations.137
All of these features of the revised refugee determination system have
come under sustained critique from human rights organizations,138 lawyers’

129. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Backgrounder — Designated Countries
of Origin” (1 February 2013), online: <www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/
backgrounders/2012/2012-11-30.asp>.
130. IRPA, supra note 63, s 111.1(2). See also Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations,
SOR/2002-227, s 159.9 [IRPA Regs].
131. IRPA, supra note 63, s 110(2)(d.1).
132. IRPA Regs, supra note 130, s 231(2).
133. IRPA, supra note 63, ss 112(2)(b)-(c).
134. Order Respecting the Interim Federal Health Program, 2012, SI/2012-26, (2012) C Gaz II,
1135, s 4(3), as amended by Order Amending the Order Respecting the Interim Federal Health
Program, 2012, SI/2012-49, (2012) C Gaz II, 1799.
135. IRPA Regs, supra note 130, s 206(2).
136. This policy was initially put forward in a private members bill. See Bill C-585, An Act to
amend the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act (period of residence), 2nd Sess, 41st Parl,
2014 (first reading 4 April 2014).
137. Notice (Order Designating Countries of Origin), (2012) C Gaz I, 3379. It was then included
in an omnibus budget bill. See A second Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled
in Parliament on February 11, 2014 and other measures, SC 2014, c 39, s 173.
138. Canadian Council for Refugees, “Protect Refugees from Bill C-31: Joint statement” (March
2012), online: <ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/coalitionstatementc31.pdf>; Canadian Civil
Liberties Association, “Bill C-31: An Unjustified Assault on the Rights of People in Danger”
(19 June 2012) [on file with authors]; Amnesty International Canada, “Unbalanced Reforms:
Recommendations with respect to Bill-31” (17 April 2012), online: <www.amnesty.ca/sites/
default/files/ai_brief_bill_c_31_to_parliamentary_committee_0.pdf>.
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associations,139 and legal academics.140 The Federal Court has gone so far as to
hold that the restrictions on publicly funded health care for DCO claimants are
unconstitutional.141 The constitutionality of the DCO regime more generally is
currently before the courts.142
Thus far, the government has been unmoved by these critiques.143 Instead,
Canadian officials celebrate the reforms and insist that they were necessary to
deter “bogus” Hungarian refugee claims.144 Indeed, the government was so
keen to use the reforms to this end that, in January 2013, they launched an
advertisement campaign in Hungary to publicize the changes.145 The campaign
focused on the town of Miskolc, which has a large Romani population. Six
billboards in Miskolc were outfitted with Canadian government logos, a notice
about revisions to the refugee determination system, and the following message:
“[P]eople who make a claim without sound reasons will be processed faster and
removed faster.”146 Only a few months earlier, the same town was the site of a

139. Canadian Bar Association, National Immigration Law Section, “Bill C-31: Protecting
Canada’s Immigration System Act” (April 2012), online: <www.cba.org/CBA/submissions/
pdf/12-27-eng.pdf>; Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, “Press Release: Designated
Country of Origin Scheme is Arbitrary, Unfair, and Unconstitutional” (14 December 2012),
online: <www.carl-acaadr.ca/articles/32>.
140. See e.g. Jennifer Bond & David Wiseman, “Shortchanging Justice: The Arbitrary
Relationship between Refugee System Reform and Federal Legal Aid Funding” (2014) 91:3
Can Bar Rev 583; Audrey Macklin, “A safe country to emulate? Canada and the European
refugee” in Hélène Lambert, Jane McAdam & Maryellen Fullerton, eds, The Global Reach
of European Refugee Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 99 [Macklin,
“Safe Country”]; Catherine Dauvergne, “It’s wrong to shut door on European refugees,” The
Vancouver Sun (28 February 2012) A9.
141. Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FC 651,
244 ACWS (3d) 73.
142. YZ v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 892, 387 DLR (4th) 676.
143. The government is, for example, appealing the Federal Court decision. Debra Black, “Federal
court rules refugee health-care cuts ‘cruel and unusual’: Tories Vow to fight decision citing
commitment to helping genuine claimants, citizens,” Toronto Star (5 July 2014) A4.
144. Chris Alexander “Speaking notes for Chris Alexander, Canada’s Citizenship and
Immigration Minister at the News Conference Regarding Canada’s Asylum System”
(Speech delivered in Toronto, 22 January 2014), online: <news.gc.ca/web/article-en.
do?nid=831769>.
145. Nicholas Keung, “Roma refugees: Canadian billboards in Hungary warn of deportation,”
Toronto Star (25 January 2013), online: <www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/01/25/
roma_refugees_canadian_billboards_in_hungary_warn_of_deportation.html>.
146. Ibid.
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march by thousands of Jobbik party supporters wielding torches and chanting
“Gypsy crime! Gypsy criminals!”147
Ultimately, all of this—the anti-Roma rhetoric in Canada, the low success
rates in Hungarian Romani refugee claims, and the revised refugee determination
process—dramatically reduced the number of Hungarian refugee claims made in
Canada (from an average of over 2,000 per year between 2008 and 2012 to under
200 in 2013), notwithstanding the alarming growth in anti-Roma activities in
Hungary. In other words, we seem to be at the end of the most recent stream of
Hungarian Romani migration to Canada.
With this context in mind, we will now turn to our study of refugee
claims decided in the context of the most recent stream of Hungarian Romani
migration to Canada.

II. THE STUDY: HUNGARIAN ROMANI REFUGEE CLAIMS
(2008–2012)
A. METHODOLOGY

Research about Canadian refugee law decision making must confront several
methodological challenges. The biggest challenges are that refugee hearings are
closed to the public148 and that only a small and non-representative proportion of
IRB refugee determinations are published.149 As a result, standard legal research
methodologies—i.e., obtaining relevant cases from legal databases and analyzing
those cases—do not allow full explorations of decision making in this area.
For this study, we used several methodologies to overcome these limitations.
We began by reading government statements, media accounts, and academic
commentary relating to Hungarian Romani refugee claims in Canada. Next,
we reviewed all published IRB and Federal Court refugee decisions involving
Hungarian Romani claimants during the period of the study. These materials
provided us with a general understanding of the more visible challenges that
Hungarian Roma faced in the refugee determination system. Our next step
was to conduct ten semi-structured interviews with staff at non-governmental
147. Marton Dunai, “Thousands rally in anti and pro Roma marches in Hungary,”
National Post (17 October 2012), online: <news.nationalpost.com/news/
thousands-rally-in-anti-and-pro-roma-marches-in-hungary>.
148. IRPA, supra note 63, s 166(c).
149. Sean Rehaag, “The Role of Counsel in Canada’s Refugee Determination System:
An Empirical Assessment” (2011) 49:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 71 at 82-83 [Rehaag,
“Role of Counsel”].
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organizations and with refugee lawyers who had personal knowledge of the
experience of Hungarian Romani refugee claimants. We conducted the interviews
in person, by telephone, and by Skype between November 2013 and March
2014. We transcribed the interviews and analyzed the transcripts for common
themes. We also made access to information requests to the IRB, seeking statistics
on refugee claim outcomes as well as large data sets from the IRB’s database
regarding thousands of individual cases (the data requested included the file
number, country, outcome, date of outcome, name of decision maker, name of
counsel, and other information). In addition to analyzing this data, we drew on
the data to request further information from the IRB for selected samples of cases,
including unpublished written reasons for decisions and documents submitted
by claimants. Because quality of counsel issues arose early in our research, we also
asked for copies of all IRB records referring to quality of counsel concerns in the
context of Hungarian Romani refugee claims.
For this study, then, we amassed a great deal of information on Canada’s
response to Hungarian Romani refugee claims between 2008 and 2012, and we
conducted both qualitative and quantitative analyses of that information.
Before we set out the results of those analyses, two methodological
limitations in our research bear emphasizing. First, the quantitative aspects of this
study offer only descriptive analysis. That is, we summarize data sets of refugee
determinations, including data sets that provide various data points for the
entire population of Hungarian Romani refugee claims finalized from 2008 to
2012. We do not conduct regression analysis or other types of tests for statistical
significance. We have chosen not to do so for a variety of reasons. Some relate to
possible confounding variables for which we cannot control, which could make
statistical tests unreliable. Others relate to challenges in interpreting statistical
tests in contexts where one has data on a full population rather than data for a
sample of that population. Because the quantitative aspects of the study offer
only descriptive statistics, we want to emphasize that we are not attempting to
make any causal claims or inferences based on the quantitative data.
Second, we did not interview Hungarian Romani refugee claimants.
Unfortunately, by the time we began this study, a large proportion of the
claimants that we would have been most interested in interviewing either had
been removed from Canada or were remaining despite having been ordered to
leave. Interviewing such claimants would have posed both practical and ethical
challenges, and we decided not to pursue such interviews. Still, we are mindful
of the dangers of academic research on marginalized communities that does not
accord attention to the voices of members of those communities. We hope that
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other scholars will supplement our research with methodologies that do a better
job of foregrounding the voices of Hungarian Romani refugee claimants.
B. STATISTICAL OVERVIEW

Tables 1 and 2 offer statistical overviews of outcomes in refugee claims from
Hungary and from all countries between 2008 and 2012. The first table includes
both principal applicants and their dependents (e.g., a family of six making a
claim together is counted as six separate decisions). It therefore offers a snapshot
of all refugee claim outcomes. The data from this table are drawn from IRB
Country Reports, which are quarterly statistical summaries prepared by the
IRB.150 The second table and all remaining tables in this article include only data
about principal applicant refugee determinations (e.g., a family of six making a
claim together is counted as a single decision).151 Table 2 therefore provides an
overview of outcomes in all refugee claim decisions without considering how
many individuals were affected by any particular decision.152 The data for this
table are based on information contained in various fields in the IRB’s database
for principal claimant refugee decisions between 2008 and 2012.153
Four points from these statistical overviews are worth emphasizing. First,
as shown in Table 1, Hungary was a major source country for refugee claimants
150. Immigration and Refugee Board, Access to Information and Privacy Request No
A-2013-00193 [on file with authors].
151. The data used to generate Tables 2 and 5-9 and the data used to generate the random samples
for Tables 3-4 and 10 include 76 principal applicant file numbers that are listed twice and
1 principal applicant file number that is listed three times (compared to 3,258 principal
applicant file numbers that are listed only once). There are a variety of circumstances that
can lead to multiple listings. For example, if a denied refugee claim is overturned on judicial
review and sent back for re-determination, there will be two listings: one for the initial
denial and one for the re-determination. Similarly, if a refugee claim is declared abandoned,
subsequently reopened, and then denied on the merits, there will be two listings: one for the
initial abandonment and one for the subsequent denial.
152. There are advantages and disadvantages to including all applicants or only principal
applicants in one’s analysis. The former approach gives a better picture of how an entire
group of applicants fare in the refugee determination system because it includes all
applicants belonging to that group. It also reduces problems related to women and children
disappearing from one’s analysis in a context where husbands or fathers are frequently listed
as the principal applicants for families. The latter gives a better picture of refugee decision
making, including reasons for decisions and grant rates of individual decision makers or
individual counsel. For example, under this approach, rates are not distorted by a single
decision for a large family.
153. Immigration and Refugee Board, Access to Information and Privacy Request No
A-2013-01523 [on file with authors].
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in Canada between 2008 and 2012. In total, 11,333 Hungarian refugee claims
were referred to the IRB, representing 8.3% of all claims during this period.
The number of Hungarian refugee claims increased from 2008 to 2011, when
it peaked at 4,423 claims (representing 17.7% of all claims made that year). In
2012, the numbers of claims dropped precipitously.154
Second, Table 1 shows that 660 Hungarians were granted refugee protection
in Canada between 2008 and 2012.155 In our view, this figure demonstrates
a major problem with the rhetoric of “bogus” Hungarian refugee claimants
discussed above: Disparaging an entire group as “bogus,” when hundreds of
members of that group have been recognized by the IRB as having well-founded
fears of persecution, compounds the mistreatment of an already marginalized
group of people.
Third, as Table 2 indicates, it was rare for the IRB to declare that refugee
claims from Hungary had no credible basis. The IRB is required to make such
a declaration in denying a refugee claim when it is of the view “that there was
no credible or trustworthy evidence on which it could have made a favourable
decision.”156 Only 1.3% of Hungarian refugee determinations were declared to
have no credible basis, a figure somewhat lower than the equivalent figure for
all countries during the same period (1.9%). This is further evidence against
assertions that Hungarian refugee claims during this period were “bogus.”
Fourth, it must be acknowledged that large numbers of Hungarian refugee
claims were not successful between 2008 and 2012. As shown in Table 1, the
recognition rate for all Hungarian refugee claimants decided on their merits
was 18.1%. This compares to a 47.2% recognition rate for claimants from all
countries during the same period. In addition, 52.5% of Hungarian refugee
claims were not decided on their merits because they were declared abandoned
or withdrawn. This is an unusually high abandonment-withdrawal rate, as
the equivalent figure for claimants from all countries is only 18.3%. Taken
together, between 2008 and 2012, only 8.6% of finalized Hungarian principal
applicant refugee determinations resulted in the claimant being accorded
refugee protection, whereas 38.5% of claimants from all countries succeeded
overall. In other words, while it is incorrect to make blanket statements about
154. This trend continued in 2013, with only 198 Hungarian claims referred, representing 1.9%
of all claims referred that year. See Immigration and Refugee Board, Access to Information
and Privacy Request No A-2013-02901 at 12 [on file with authors] [ATIP Request
No A-2013-02901].
155. According to the 2013 IRB Country Report, a further 406 Hungarians were granted refugee
protection in Canada in 2013. See ATIP Request No A-2013-02901, ibid.
156. IRPA, supra note 63, s 107(2).
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Hungarian claims being “bogus,” it would be fair to say that, in a large majority
of Hungarian refugee claims finalized between 2008 and 2012, claimants did not
obtain refugee protection.
The rest of this article explores both the causes and the implications of the
patterns evident in these two tables.
C. CLAIM TYPE

There has been some dispute about whether, in debates about Hungarian
refugee claims, one is essentially speaking about Hungarian Romani claimants.
The reason for the controversy is that, as discussed above, political actors have
often singled out Hungarian refugee claimants as making “bogus” claims with the
intent of abusing Canadian social programs. In doing so, some political actors
were careful to avoid speaking explicitly about Hungarian Roma.157 Nonetheless,
because everyone hearing such statements understood that most Hungarian
refugee claimants are Romani, these political actors were able to convey the
message that Hungarian Roma were abusing the refugee determination system
while avoiding saying this outright. This is noteworthy because, had these actors
referred explicitly to Roma, they would have been exposed to claims of racism
and of drawing on the same stereotypes that animate anti-Roma sentiments in
countries like Hungary.
Unfortunately, the IRB did not systematically gather data on claim type or
on the ethnicity of refugee claimants during the period of the study. According
to data provided in response to access to information requests, information
on claim type158 is available in the IRB’s database for only 81 cases out of the
3,334 Hungarian principal applicant decisions between 2008 and 2012 under

157. For example, an article in the Toronto Star in 2013 initially reported that Minister of
Immigration Jason Kenney spoke out against “bogus Roma refugees.” After the accuracy
of this reporting was challenged, the article was revised to say that the Minister had in fact
spoken about “bogus refugee claimants and singled out claimants from Hungary.” See Louise
Brown, “Parkdale schools mourn deported Roma students,” Toronto Star (6 October 2013),
online: <www.thestar.com/yourtoronto/education/2013/10/06/parkdale_schools_mourn_
deported_roma_students.html>.
158. The IRB’s database includes the fields “Claim Basis Category” and “Claim Basis Type”—the
latter being a subset of the former. These fields categorize the grounds on which the claim
was forwarded. “Roma” is one Claim Basis Type subcategory of the “Race/Ethnicity”
Claim Basis Category. For a discussion of the IRB’s claim type data, including limits on
the reliability of this data, see Sean Rehaag, “Do Women Refugee Judges Really Make
a Difference? An Empirical Analysis of Gender and Outcomes in Canadian Refugee
Determinations” (2011) 23:2 CJWL 627 at 639-40.
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consideration in this study.159 The claim type is recorded as involving alleged
persecution on account of Romani ethnicity in 90.1% of these 81 cases, on
account of gender in 6.1% and on account of criminality in 3.7%. This would,
at first glance, suggest that a high percentage of Hungarian claims between 2008
and 2012 involved allegations of persecution on account of Romani ethnicity.
However, because claim type information is not available in the IRB’s database
for the vast majority (97.5%) of Hungarian principal applicant refugee claims
decided during this period and because it is unclear to us in what circumstances
the IRB chose to gather claim type information, we have no way of knowing
whether the cases with claim type information constitute a representative sample
of all Hungarian cases decided during this period.
TABLE 3: CLAIM TYPE IN RANDOM SAMPLE OF PRINCIPAL APPLICANT
HUNGARIAN DECISIONS (MERITS) (2008-2012)*
Type

Positive

Negative

Total

Percent of Total (%)

Recognition Rate
(Merits) (%)

Roma

24

58

82

85.4

29.3

Other

1

13

14

14.6

7.1

Total

25

71

96

100.0

26.0

SOURCE: IRB ATIP Request No. A-2013-00778

To supplement this potentially unrepresentative sample, we obtained written
reasons for decisions (and in cases where no written reasons were issued, other
documents describing the claim) that allowed us to determine the claimant’s
identified ethnicity for a random sample160 of 96 Hungarian principal applicant

159. Immigration and Refugee Board, Access to Information and Privacy Request No
A-2013-01523 [on file with authors]; Immigration and Refugee Board, Access to
Information and Privacy Request No A-2014-00705 [on file with authors].
160. All random samples referred to in this article were generated using statistical software. A
list of all cases matching the criteria we wanted to sample from was generated (e.g., a list of
all Hungarian principal applicant claims finalized on the merits between 2008 and 2012).
Statistical software (STATA’s sample command) was then used to randomly select the desired
number of cases from that list. The relevant documents from these specific randomly selected
cases were then requested from the IRB.
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refugee cases decided on their merits between 2008 and 2012.161 As can be
seen in Table 3, claimants were identified as Romani in 85.4% of the cases. It
should be noted that some of these cases involved multiple grounds of alleged
persecution (e.g., gender and Romani ethnicity, sexual orientation, Romani
ethnicity, et cetera). The remaining 14.6% of cases involved various claim types,
including gender, sexual orientation, and criminality. In these cases, the claimant’s
ethnicity was seldom explicitly addressed. Interestingly, the recognition rate in
cases involving Roma (29.3%) was higher than for the other Hungarian cases in
this sample (7.1%).
Based both on the cases in the IRB’s database where claim type information
is recorded and on our random sample of 96 Hungarian principal applicant cases
decided on the merits, it seems clear that the vast majority of refugee claims made
in Canada by Hungarians between 2008 and 2012 involved Romani claimants.
Thus, when political actors spoke about Hungarian claimants during this period,
they were speaking by and large about Hungarian Romani claimants, and their
comments must be understood in that racialized context.

161. Immigration and Refugee Board, Access to Information and Privacy Request No
A-2013-00778 [on file with authors] [ATIP Request No A-2013-00778]. The documents
requested were: (1) written reasons for decisions and (2) screening forms or in chambers
decisions forms where there were no written reasons. The sample we requested initially
included one hundred Hungarian cases decided on the merits between 2008 and 2012.
When we received the documents requested, we excluded four cases from the sample, three
because no data on claim type was available in the documents provided and one because it
was not a Hungarian case.
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D. GROUNDS FOR DENIAL
TABLE 4: REASONS FOR DENIAL IN RANDOM SAMPLE OF HUNGARIAN ROMANI
PRINCIPAL APPLICANT DECISIONS (MERITS) (2008-2012)
Outcome and reasons

Number

Percent of Total
(%)*

Percent of
Denied (%)*

Refugee Status Denied

58

70.7

n/a

State protection

56

68.3

96.6

Discrimination v persecution

25

30.5

43.1

General negative credibility

25

30.5

43.1

Internal flight alternative

1

1.2

1.7

External flight alternative (EU)

0

0.0

0.0

Roma ethnicity not established

0

0.0

0.0

Exclusion

0

0.0

0.0

Refugee Status Granted

24

29.3

n/a

Total

82

100.0

n/a

SOURCE: IRB ATIP Request No. A-2013-00778
*
Numbers add up to more than the total because cases may have multiple
reasons for refusal

As we have seen, while many Hungarian refugee claimants obtained
refugee protection between 2008 and 2012, many others did not. To understand
the reasons offered by the IRB to justify outcomes in these claims, we reviewed
the written reasons (and where reasons were unavailable, other documents
describing the claim) in the random sample of 96 Hungarian refugee decisions
examined in Part I(B), above. Table 4 sets out the frequency of particular
types of reasons, including specific grounds of denial, in the 82 refugee claims
in our sample that involved Hungarian Roma.162
1.

STATE PROTECTION

The most frequent reason offered for refusing refugee protection in our sample
of Hungarian Romani refugee claims was the availability of state protection.
162. ATIP Request No A-2013-00778, supra note 161. Of the 96 cases included in our sample
(see Table 3, above), 14 were excluded because they did not involve Romani claimants.
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To succeed with a refugee claim under section 96 of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act (“IRPA”), a claimant must demonstrate a well-founded fear of
persecution due to race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership
in a particular social group.163 Establishing a well-founded fear of persecution
requires, among other things, demonstrating that protection by state authorities
against the feared persecution is not available in the claimant’s home country.164
Case law suggests that, absent a complete state breakdown, state protection is
presumed to be forthcoming. As a result, claimants bear the burden of rebutting
this presumption.165 There is also case law suggesting that claimants who come
from democratic countries bear an especially heavy burden in the sense that it is
more difficult to rebut this presumption.166
As can been seen in Table 4, in 68.3% of our sample of Hungarian Romani
decisions (or 96.6% of the negative Hungarian Romani decisions), the IRB
refused to accord refugee protection at least partly because claimants failed
to rebut the presumption of state protection. During the 2008–2012 period,
however, the IRB granted refugee protection to hundreds of Hungarian Roma—
including 29.3% of the Hungarian Romani cases in our sample. In these cases,
claimants successfully rebutted the presumption of state protection. Thus, it
would appear that the IRB did not have a consistent answer to the question
of whether Hungarian authorities offered Roma protection against persecution
between 2008 and 2012.
In considering the lack of consensus at the IRB regarding the availability
of state protection, it is important to keep in mind that the characteristics of
individual claims may have an impact on the state protection analysis. For
example, claimants facing multiple intersecting forms of persecution (e.g.,
persecution on account of both ethnicity and gender) may encounter distinct
barriers in obtaining state protection. Along similar lines, many factors could
facilitate or limit the ability of individual claimants to obtain state protection
(e.g., education, language skills, social capital, or resources). Therefore, in
163. IRPA, supra note 63, s 96. Canada also provides protection to persons in need of protection,
as defined in s 97. This section drops the required connection to specified grounds of
persecution but adds other limitations. No Hungarian Romani refugee claims in our sample
were denied on the basis that the harm feared was unrelated to a Refugee Convention ground.
As a result, their claims were assessed under s 96 rather than s 97.
164. Canada (AG) v Ward, [1993] 2 SCR 689 at para 25, 103 DLR (4th) 1 [Ward].
165. Ibid at paras 50-51.
166. Hinzman v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 171 at para
57, 282 DLR (4th) 413; Flores Carrillo v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2008 FCA 94 at paras 26, 32, [2008] 4 FCR 636.
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analyzing the availability of state protection, the IRB must be attentive to the
particular circumstances of each claimant. As Federal Court Justice Zinn has
stated regarding Hungarian Roma cases: “Each decision turns on its own facts
... which explains why many claims are denied on the basis of state protection
while others succeed, despite being determined on the basis of the same national
documentation.”167 Nevertheless, the allegations and evidence of anti-Roma
persecution and the alleged failure of Hungarian authorities to do enough
to prevent it were similar in many of the cases we reviewed, and yet the state
protection findings varied. Indeed, having reviewed many Hungarian Romani
IRB and Federal Court cases that address this issue, we often found it impossible
to differentiate cases that came down on either side of this issue.
Part of the problem is that the evidence of country conditions available to
the IRB was mixed. Federal Court Justice Gagné describes the lack of clarity in
Hungarian country-conditions evidence in the following terms:
Quite obviously, the documentary evidence regarding the adequacy of antidiscrimination state action in Hungary is contradictory in many respects and the
question remains unresolved in recent decisions of the Board’s and in this Court’s
recent jurisprudence. … [T]he objective documentary evidence allows for a
determination either way.168

In addition to the problem of inconclusive country-conditions evidence,
there was also controversy over the legal test for determining the availability of
state protection during the period of our study. This controversy related to the fact
that failures in law enforcement are inevitable and therefore no country can offer
perfect protection to everyone all the time.169 Given the inevitability of imperfect
state protection, the question became how much failure of state protection must
be demonstrated to rebut the presumption, especially in circumstances where
the state is at least attempting to provide protection. Case law has proposed a
variety of tests to answer this question, including: whether the state is making
serious efforts at providing protection,170 whether those efforts are translating

167. Ignacz v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 1164 at para 2, 235
ACWS (3d) 1057.
168. Nagy v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 299 at para 23,
227 ACWS (3d) 527.
169. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v Villafranca (1992), 99 DLR (4th) 334,
37 ACWS (3d) 1259 (FCA).
170. Ibid.
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into effective protection,171 whether there is protection at the operational level,172
whether the level of protection is adequate,173 and whether there is operationally
adequate protection.174 Notice that the focus of these tests varies. Some focus on
whether the state is trying to provide protection, others on whether claimants will
actually be protected, and still others on whether the level of protection meets
a particular standard. The different foci of these tests are especially relevant in
the context of Hungarian Romani refugee claims because of the mixed evidence
noted above. Thus, whether Hungarian Romani claimants were able to rebut the
presumption of state protection may have depended in part on which of these
tests were applied.
Given both the contradictory country-conditions evidence and the
controversy over the proper legal test for assessing that evidence, it is perhaps
not surprising that there was no consensus at the IRB as to whether Hungarian
Roma could reasonably expect protection against persecution in Hungary.
Moreover, as we have noted, the individual circumstances of claimants further
complicate matters such that, even with the same country-conditions evidence
and the same legal test, the result of the state protection analysis may vary from
claimant to claimant. One thing is clear from our sample of cases, however:
Success in Hungarian Romani refugee claims between 2008 and 2012 appeared
to depend largely on whether claimants were able to rebut the presumption of
state protection.
2.

DISCRIMINATION VERSUS PERSECUTION

Another common reason cited for refusing refugee protection in our sample of
Hungarian Romani decisions relates to whether claimants feared persecution or
discrimination. To meet the refugee definition under section 96 of the IRPA, a
claimant must show that the mistreatment they fear amounts to persecution,

171. Mohacsi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] 4 FCR 772 at para
56, 231 FTR 276.
172. Gilvaja v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 598 at para 39,
178 ACWS (3d) 201.
173. Hercegi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 250 at para 5, 211
ACWS (3d) 946; Jaroslav v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 634
at paras 74-75, 204 ACWS (3d) 139.
174. Meza Varela v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1364 at paras
15-16, 209 ACWS (3d) 648.
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which has been defined as serious mistreatment that violates core human rights.175
For the purposes of the refugee definition, discrimination does not amount to
persecution, though multiple instances of discrimination and harassment that
are not individually violations of core human rights may cumulatively amount
to persecution.176
In 30.5% of the cases in our sample of Hungarian Romani refugee decisions
(or 43.1% of the negative Hungarian Romani refugee decisions), refugee claims
were denied at least in part because claimants failed to demonstrate that the
harm they feared constituted persecution. In virtually all of the decisions in
our sample, the IRB acknowledged that conditions in Hungary are difficult for
Roma. However, the IRB often found that the mistreatment experienced by the
claimants involved discrimination that did not reach the level of persecution.
These findings regarding discrimination versus persecution were seldom
determinative, however. After making such findings, the IRB typically went on
to consider whether, if returned to Hungary, claimants would face persecution on
account of their ethnicity despite only having experienced discrimination in the
past. This forward-looking risk analysis typically turned on the question of state
protection. Thus, while discrimination versus persecution was an issue in many
Hungarian Romani cases in our sample, it was less often determinative than the
availability of state protection.177
3.

GENERAL NEGATIVE CREDIBILITY

A third common reason offered for refusing refugee protection in our sample
related to whether claimants were generally credible. Refugee claimants bear
the burden of proving that they meet the refugee definition.178 To try to meet
this burden, claimants usually introduce a variety of evidence, including general
evidence relating to conditions in their home countries and individual evidence
175. Lebedev v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 728 at para 25, [2008]
2 FCR 585. See also James C Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Toronto: Butterworths,
1991) at 104-105.
176. Bobrik v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 50 ACWS (3d) 850 at 85 FTR
13 at para 22,; UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva:
UNHCR, 1979) at 13-14, paras 51-55 [UNHCR, Handbook].
177. Only two Hungarian Roma cases in our sample were denied partly because the IRB found
that the claimants feared discrimination rather than persecution without an alternative
finding that state protection was available. See ATIP Request No A-2013-00778, supra
note 161 at 385 (RPD File No TA9-14522, 22 June 2011); ibid at 951 (RPD File No
TB1-05181, 24 May 2012).
178. UNHCR, Handbook, supra note 176 at 38, para 196.
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that corroborates their allegations. In addition to documentary evidence,
claimant testimony plays a central role in most refugee determinations because
documentary evidence is seldom available for many key aspects of the stories
recounted by claimants.179
In assessing refugee claimant evidence—including claimant testimony—the
IRB is not bound by “legal or technical rules of evidence” that apply in other
areas of law and instead may “receive and base a decision on evidence that is …
considered credible or trustworthy in the circumstances.”180 Case law establishes
that claimant testimony is presumed true unless a good reason exists for doubt, and
if the IRB doubts claimant testimony, it must articulate reasonable justifications
for this doubt based on the available evidence.181 That being said, the standard
of proof for factual findings in refugee law is the balance of probabilities, and
claimants bear the burden of proof; together, these points mean that claimants
must demonstrate that they are more likely than not to be credible.182
Claimants were found generally not credible in 30.5% of our sample of
Hungarian Romani claims. A variety of reasons were offered to support these
negative credibility determinations. It was common, for example, for the IRB to
point out inconsistencies between versions of stories recounted by claimants in
various stages of the refugee determination process. The IRB frequently pointed
to contradictions in details between the version of the claimant’s story told to an
immigration officer when the refugee claim was first made, the written narrative
submitted by the claimant, and claimant testimony at the refugee hearing. The
IRB also often complained that claimants added important facts during their
testimony that, if true, should have been (but were not) included in their written
narratives, thus casting doubt on whether the testimony was truthful. The IRB
also doubted claimant testimony when it was considered vague, lacking in detail,
or implausible.
While general negative credibility determinations were not uncommon in
our sample of Hungarian Romani decisions, in most cases where the IRB found
that the claimants’ stories of mistreatment were untrue, the IRB nonetheless
went on to consider whether they would face anti-Roma persecution if returned
to Hungary. This then typically led the IRB to consider the matter of state
179. Martin Jones & Sasha Baglay, Refugee Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) at 241.
180. IRPA, supra note 63, ss 170(g)-(h).
181. Maldonado v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1980] 2 FC 302 at para 5,
1 ACWS (2d) 167.
182. Orelien v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 FC 592,
30 ACWS (3d) 890.
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protection, and as we have seen, the IRB found that state protection was available
in 96.6% of the negative Hungarian Roma decisions in our sample. Thus, like
IRB findings related to discrimination versus persecution, negative credibility
determinations were seldom determinative.183
It would therefore be fair to say that credibility posed challenges for many
of the Hungarian Romani refugee claimants in our sample even though negative
credibility determinations were usually not the only grounds for denying claims
in these cases. We would also hasten to add, however, that in the majority of
Hungarian Romani cases in our sample (69.5%), there was no negative credibility
determination. In our view, this fact provides further evidence against assertions
that Hungarian Romani refugee claims during this period were “bogus.”
4.

OTHER GROUNDS OF REFUSAL

State protection, discrimination versus persecution, and general negative
credibility findings were, by a substantial margin, the main grounds offered for
denying refugee claims in our sample of Hungarian Romani cases. We would,
however, like to say a little about other grounds of refusal that were infrequently
or never cited in the cases in our sample.
First, only one Hungarian Romani refugee claim in our sample was denied
at least in part because the claimant had a viable internal flight alternative.184
To meet the refugee definition under section 96 of the IRPA, claimants must
establish a well-founded fear of persecution throughout their entire country. If
refugee claimants can avoid persecution by relocating to another region of their
country, and if conditions are such that it would not be unreasonable to expect
them to do so, their claims will be denied due to the availability of an internal
flight alternative.185 The only Hungarian Romani claim in our sample denied
partly on this basis involved a claimant who alleged that he faced anti-Roma
persecution in the small town in which he lived.186 The IRB found that he could
183. Only two Hungarian Romani cases in our sample involved a general negative credibility
finding that did not also include a finding that state protection was available. These were
the same two cases where the IRB found that the claimants faced discrimination rather than
persecution without going on to make a finding regarding the availability of state protection.
184. ATIP Request No A-2013-00778, supra note 161 at 94 (RPD File No VA8-02053,
26 August 2011).
185. Rasaratnam v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 FC 706, 31
ACWS (3d) 139; Thirunavukkarasu v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)
(1993), [1994] 1 FCR 589, 109 DLR (4th) 682 (FCA).
186. ATIP Request No A-2013-00778, supra note 161 at 94, paras 6-8 (RPD File No
VA8-02053, 26 August 2011).
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reasonably relocate to Budapest where, if he faced mistreatment on the basis of
his ethnicity, he could approach Hungarian authorities for protection.187 Thus,
the one Hungarian Romani case in our sample denied partly on the basis of an
internal flight alternative could also be considered a state protection finding. It
would seem, therefore, that the availability of an internal flight alternative was
not a major impediment for most Hungarian Romani refugee claimants during
the period of our study.
Second, no Hungarian Romani refugee claims in our sample were denied on
the basis that, as nationals of an EU country, claimants could relocate to another
EU country to avoid persecution in Hungary.188 In other words, none of the
claims in our sample was denied on the basis of an “external flight alternative.”189
The fact that no claims were denied on this basis reflects the principle that
the refugee definition only requires a well-founded fear of persecution in the
claimant’s country or countries of nationality,190 not in other countries to
which the claimant could potentially relocate without automatically enjoying
citizenship rights.191 We raise this point because EU mobility rights often arise
in debates about Hungarian Romani refugee claims, but such mobility rights are
irrelevant as a legal matter.192 Moreover, even if EU mobility rights were legally
relevant, it should be noted that Hungarian Roma may not actually be able to
relocate safely to other EU countries. To begin with, there are restrictions on

187. Ibid at paras 18-24.
188. Some Hungarian Roma in our sample (usually children and spouses of principal applicants)
had claims denied on the basis that they were nationals of countries other than Hungary
and that they would not face persecution in their other countries of nationality. We did
not gather statistics on this as we were primarily interested in how the IRB assessed claims
regarding Hungary (rather than claims regarding other countries of nationality).
189. We borrow this language from one of the positive Romani cases in our sample, where
the RPD found that “the claimants do not have a viable external flight alternative in the
European Union as the right of residence is conditional on the attention of work within
a tight deadline [sic].” See ATIP Request No A-2013-00778, supra note 161 at 79-80,
VB0-02549 (14 December 2011). The term has also been used in recently reported case
law. See e.g. Hermann v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 266,
239 ACWS (3d) 464.
190. Ward, supra note 164 at paras 88-96.
191. Katkova v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1997), 130 FTR 192, 71
ACWS (3d) 347 (FCTD). The case law distinguishes between countries of “potential”
citizenship and countries where the claimant has a “pre-existing right” to citizenship.
See Crast v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 146 at paras
19-20, 308 FTR 241.
192. Macklin, “Safe Country,” supra note 140 at 109-13.
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EU mobility rights,193 and many Roma were deported from EU countries for
failing to comply with these restrictions during the period of our study.194 In
addition, it is questionable whether Hungarian Roma would be protected against
persecution in some other EU countries, even with legal status.195
Third, none of the Hungarian Romani refugee claims in our sample were
denied on the basis that claimants failed to establish that they were, in fact,
Romani. Indeed, the matter seldom arose at all. Very few cases explicitly addressed
why the IRB believed the claimant’s assertions about their Romani ethnicity, and
no cases explicitly disbelieved those assertions. Although the matter did not arise
in our sample, it has arisen in reported cases.196 The Federal Court has cautioned
against resorting to “stereotypes and assumptions” to assess Romani ethnicity
and urged decision makers not to “fixate on skin, hair and eye colour, which
demonstrates minimal understanding of ethnicity.”197 At any rate, based on our
sample, failure to substantiate a Hungarian Romani identity does not appear to
be a common reason for refusing refugee protection.
Fourth, none of the cases in our sample of Hungarian Romani refugee
claims were refused due to exclusion provisions. Under these provisions, a person
who would otherwise meet the refugee definition can be excluded from refugee
protection on the basis of having committed serious non-political crimes outside
Canada, crimes against humanity or war crimes, or acts that are contrary to the
principles and purposes of the United Nations.198 Given the frequency with
193. Ibid at 111-12.
194. Steven Erlanger, “France Intensifies Effort to Expel Roma, Raising Questions,” New York
Times (20 August 2010) A4.
195. See e.g. Amnesty International, “Roma in Europe: Demanding justice and protection in
the face of violence” (8 April 2014), online: <www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/04/
roma-europe-demanding-justice-and-protection-face-violence>.
196. See e.g. Varga v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 494, 227 ACWS
(3d) 1135 [Varga]; Darabos v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC
484, 81 Admin LR (4th) 269; Galyas v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2013 FC 250, 429 FTR 1 [Galyas].
197. Varga, supra note 196 at paras 17, 20. There were cases in our sample where the “visibility”
of the claimant’s Romani ethnicity to potential persecutors was treated as relevant in
terms of assessing the likelihood that the claimants would face persecution. These cases
involved problematic reliance on stereotypes about what makes Romani ethnicity “visible.”
See e.g. ATIP Request No A-2013-00778, supra note 161 at 94, paras 5, 18 (RPD File
No VA8-02053, 26 August 2011) (where the IRB notes that the claimant has a “light
complexion with blue eyes, but alleges that he has facial features that makes him be
recognized as someone with a Roma ethnicity” and then goes on to find that the claimant’s
“Roma background is not immediately visible to most” [sic]).
198. IRPA, supra note 63, s 98.
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which criminality arises as a theme in debates about Hungarian Romani refugee
claims, we think it is worth emphasizing that our sample suggests that Hungarian
Romani refugee claimants were seldom excluded from refugee protection due to
serious criminality between 2008 and 2012.
E.

INSTITUTIONAL BIAS

We were curious whether other factors, beyond the legal reasons identified in Part
II(D), above, affected outcomes in Hungarian Romani refugee claims during the
period of our study. To begin answering this question, we asked ten interviewees
(five lawyers and five staff members at non-governmental organizations with
experience assisting Hungarian Roma in navigating the refugee-determination
system) what they thought accounted for low success rates in Hungarian
Romani refugee claims. Eight of the ten interviewees raised concerns related to
institutional bias against Hungarian Roma at the IRB.199
In explaining how this institutional bias operates, several interviewees
suggested that decision makers at the IRB were influenced by negative portrayals
of Hungarian Roma as “bogus” refugee claimants, particularly through
negative comments made by Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Jason
Kenney. For example:
[T]he acceptance rate used to be rather high. … And then when the Minister began
the public defamation of the Roma, that they were frauds and cheats and here for
economic reasons, the numbers just dropped dramatically. So part of the problem
was the political voice of prejudice.200
[…]
[T]he Minister started to speak about the Roma claims, and talking about bogus
refugee claims … . … [This] rhetoric had to have had a chilling effect on the board
members.201
[…]

199. Interviews of staff at non-governmental organizations and refugee lawyers who have personal
knowledge of the experience of Hungarian Romani refugee claimants [on file with authors]
[Interviews] (Interviews 1-6, 9-10). As noted in Part II(A), above, the interviews were
conducted in person, by telephone, and by Skype between November 2013 and March
2014. While we can see how whether the interviewee is a lawyer or a worker in a community
organization might be of interest to the reader, we have decided against providing this
information; given the size of the community, this information might identify one or more
of our interviewees.
200. Ibid at 108 (Interview 10).
201. Ibid at 20 (Interview 2).
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[I]t’s very difficult to believe that the refugee board could be completely shielded
from the political opinion of the Minister … . … The discrimination faced by the
Roma obviously is, even apart from what the minister says, one of those baseline
factors that is bound to affect all but a few particularly scrupulous board members.
I think it’s just sort of there, in the culture.202

Another interviewee went further, contending not only that decision makers
were subconsciously influenced by negative portrayals of Hungarian Romani
refugee claimants but also that some may have denied these claims out of
concern for their careers.203 That interviewee noted that, during the period of our
study, IRB decision makers were appointed and reappointed through processes
controlled largely by the Minister.204 As a result, this argument runs, decision
makers may have avoided granting Hungarian Romani refugee claims partly out
of fear that they would not be reappointed. In this interviewee’s words, “I think it
had a chilling effect and it sent a message to the board members that if you want
to be renewed, you toe the party line.”205
Another institutional bias argument raised by some interviewees related to
decision makers copying long passages from reasons for denying other Hungarian
Romani cases rather than writing unique reasons engaging with the specific
circumstances of each case:
You see a lot of the decisions tend to copy each other for precedents … finding that
there is protection, [that] Roma don’t face persecution, and so on … . And certainly
those precedents are coming from somewhere, even if it’s from other members
but definitely it looked like there was a… I don’t know if it’s enough to establish
institutional bias in the legal sense but definitely there was bias on the part of the
IRB to want to refuse those claims.206
[…]
[Decision makers] may take shortcuts. … [I]nstead of looking at the country
evidence … and reading it in the context of each case, … you end up cutting and
pasting. … [T]here’s a concern about the board using cookie-cutter reasons in the
Roma cases. … [I]nstead of spending … 20 hours reading the documents, they look

202. Ibid at 31 (Interview 3).
203. Ibid (Interview 4).
204. For a discussion of the appointment process during the period of the study, and an analysis
of how that process arguably left the IRB vulnerable to allegations of institutional bias,
see Jacqueline Bonisteel, “Ministerial Influence at the Canadian Immigration and Refugee
Board: The Case for Institutional Bias” (2010) 27:1 Refuge 103.
205. Interviews, supra note 199 at 50 (Interview 4).
206. Ibid at 3-4 (Interview 1).
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at precedents from colleagues and say well “ok this is how we do it”, so that kind of
perpetuates the boilerplate reasons.207

In considering the views expressed by our interviewees about institutional
bias, it is worth recalling our earlier discussion of Canada’s response to the first
stream of Hungarian Roma from 1998 to 2002.208 As noted, the 1998 Hungarian
Roma lead case—which severely reduced success rates for Hungarian Romani
refugee claimants—was overturned in 2006 by the FCA on the basis of a reasonable
apprehension of bias.209 The court found that it was reasonable to infer that the
lead case was “tainted” by a motivation “to reduce the percentage of positive
decisions in claims for refugee status by Hungarian Roma” and was “calculated to
deter Roma from leaving for Canada in order to claim refugee status.”210
If this type of institutional bias against Hungarian Romani refugee claimants
existed at the IRB in 1998, could there, as most of our interviewees suggest, have
been a similar bias between 2008 and 2012? We believe there are good reasons to
be concerned about this possibility.
As we have seen, cracking down on alleged abuse of the refugee determination
system was a major policy objective of the government during our study period,
and Hungarian Roma were repeatedly held up as the prime example of this alleged
abuse. At the same time, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Jason
Kenney, demonstrated that he held little regard for institutional independence.
One especially troubling incident involved a speech in which Minister Kenney
criticized Federal Court judges for second-guessing the decisions of immigration
officials and for failing to enthusiastically embrace the government’s efforts to
toughen the immigration and refugee system.211 In response, the Canadian Bar
Association President, Rod Snow, suggested that public criticism by a cabinet
minister of “judges who follow the law but not the government’s political agenda
is an affront to our democracy and freedoms”212—a view echoed by Supreme

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Ibid at 20-21 (Interview 2).
See Part II(C), above.
Kozak, supra note 91.
Ibid at para 65.
Jason Kenney, “Speaking notes for the Honourable Jason Kenney,P.C., M.P. Minister
of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism at an event at the Faculty of Law,
University of Western Ontario” (Speech delivered in London, Ont, 11 February 2011),
online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada <www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/
speeches/2011/2011-02-11.asp>.
212. Letter from Rod Snow to Jason Kenney (22 February 2011), online: <www.cba.org/CBA/
submissions/pdf/11-12-eng.pdf>.
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Court of Canada Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin.213 In this context, would it
be surprising if decision makers at the IRB, who (unlike judges) did not enjoy
security of tenure, felt pressure to adhere to the views of the Minister on whose
good graces their careers depended?
There is also other evidence that provides cause for concern with regard
to institutional bias. In our sample of Hungarian Romani refugee decisions,
lengthy passages were often copied word-for-word from other decisions, with
no indication that these passages were copied. Moreover, a document that we
obtained from the IRB through an access to information request indicates that
Hungarian Romani decisions were circulated among decision makers at the
IRB.214 That document, which is undated, was written by someone involved
in managing a team of decision makers at the IRB—likely a Coordinating
Member—working on Hungarian refugee claims. The document discusses
meetings that occurred when a second team of decision makers was assigned to
hear Hungarian refugee claims:
[I]n order to have consistency and no variance [we] held a joint meeting to discuss
the issues [and] also provided CM [the Coordinating Member of the other team]
with several decisions of my team that had been upheld by [the] Federal Court—
which the new team found useful.215

There are, to be sure, good reasons for decision makers who are working on
similar cases to share decisions, most notably in order to enhance consistency
in decision making. However, this practice also poses serious risks, especially
in a context where the decisions are not publicly available—as is the case for
most refugee determinations. One risk is a bias in favor of decisions denying
refugee protection. Most positive decisions during the period of our study lacked
written reasons;216 thus, the circulated reasons were more likely to be negative
than positive precedents. Along similar lines, if the circulated decisions were
selected because they had been upheld on judicial review, they were even more
likely to be precedents for denying refugee claims because very few positive
refugee decisions are judicially reviewed.217 If these mostly negative decisions
213. Richard Foot, “Chief Justice supports criticism of Kenney,” National Post (13 August 2011),
online: <news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/chief-justice-supports-criticism-of-kenney>.
214. Immigration and Refugee Board, Access to Information and Privacy Request No
A-2013-00619 [on file with authors].
215. Ibid at 1245.
216. Rehaag, “Role of Counsel,” supra note 149 at 82-83.
217. Sean Rehaag, “Judicial Review of Refugee Determinations: The Luck of the Draw?” (2012)
38:1 Queen’s LJ 1 at 24.
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were circulated among decision makers and then substantially copied without
attribution, then they essentially played the same role as the 1998 lead case: That
is to say, they offered non-binding guidance in Hungarian Romani cases in a
manner that reduced success rates in these cases. The most troubling aspect of
this non-binding guidance is that it is non-transparent. Those outside the IRB
have no idea what cases have been circulated internally, and there is no oversight
to ensure that these cases offer a fair representation of a particular group of
claims. This lack of transparency is compounded when decision makers—guided
by these disproportionately negative cases—fail to provide copies of the cases to
claimants in advance, arguably breaching the claimants’ constitutional right to
know the case against them and to offer a response.218
In our view, if a decision maker wishes to draw on unpublished refugee
cases, then at a minimum those unpublished cases should be communicated in
advance to the claimant, who should have an opportunity to explain whether
their circumstances can be differentiated. Moreover, to avoid the perception of
institutional bias, it is essential that both negative and positive precedents be
shared with decision makers and with claimants. Unfortunately, it seems likely
that neither of these conditions was met with regard to Hungarian Romani
refugee claims during the period of this study. Moreover, this occurred in a
context where decision makers might—in light of Minister Kenney’s negative
comments—reasonably be concerned about their career prospects should they
grant large numbers of Hungarian Romani refugee claims. Taken together, we
agree with our interviewees that there are good reasons to be worried about
the fairness and impartiality of decision making regarding Hungarian Romani
refugee claims during this period.
F.

CONSISTENCY AT THE IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD

While institutional bias at the IRB is a concern, partly due to problematic
practices aimed at enhancing consistency in decision making, there also appear
to be serious problems relating to inconsistent decision making during the same
period. As already discussed, the reasons offered by the IRB for outcomes in
Hungarian Romani refugee claims involve some degree of inconsistency, most
notably with regard to conflicting findings on the availability of state protection.
In addition to these sorts of inconsistencies, several of our interviewees raised
concerns about troubling inconsistencies in patterns of decisions made by
218. Singh v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] 1 SCR 117 at paras
57-58, 17 DLR (4th) 422.
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particular decision makers.219 As one interviewee put it: “The big disparity is in
who is the judge. There are judges who don’t give positives and there are judges
who give positives … .”220
One way to assess these impressions regarding disparities in decision making
across adjudicators is to look at variations in recognition rates. Prior research has
used electronic data from the IRB’s internal database, obtained through access to
information procedures, to examine such variations.221 According to this research,
in 2006, “refugee claim grant rates fluctuated dramatically across individual IRB
adjudicators … Some … granted refugee status in virtually all claims they hear;
others granted refugee status rarely if at all.”222
For the present study, we followed a similar methodology. Using data
obtained through an access to information request,223 we examined two sets of
variations in recognition rates in all principal applicant Hungarian refugee claims
between 2008 and 2012: one involving variations across IRB offices and the
other involving variations across individual decision makers.
TABLE 5: OUTCOMES IN PRINCIPAL APPLICANT FINAL RPD DECISIONS FOR
HUNGARIAN CLAIMANTS, BY REGION (2008-2012)*
Region**

Abandoned / Negative
Positive Total
Withdrawn
***

Recognition
Rate (Merits)
(%)

Abandoned Overall
/ Withdrawn Success
Rate (%)
Rate (%)

Central

1,709

936

164

2,809

14.9

60.8

5.8

Western

139

101

32

272

24.1

51.1

11.8

Eastern

147

66

40

253

37.7

58.1

15.8

1,995

1,103

236

3,334

17.6

59.8

7.1

Total

SOURCE: IRB ATIP Request No. A-2013-01523
*
Excluding cases with outcomes other than negative, positive, abandonded and withdrawn
** Based on first letter of RPD number
*** Includes negative, no credible basis

219. Interviews, supra note 199 (Interviews 4-5, 9).
220. Ibid at 102 (Interview 9).
221. Sean Rehaag, “Troubling Patterns in Canadian Refugee Adjudication” (2008) 39:2
Ottawa L Rev 335.
222. Ibid at 362.
223. Immigration and Refugee Board, Access to Information and Privacy Request No
A-2013-01523/DE [on file with authors].
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Table 5 describes outcomes in Hungarian principal applicant refugee claims
(broken down by the region where the claim was filed) decided between 2008
and 2012. As the table shows, 84.3% of the 3,334 principal applicant Hungarian
refugee claims finalized during this period were filed in Central Canada
(Ontario), compared to only 8.2% filed in Western Canada and 7.6% in Eastern
Canada. The table also indicates that recognition rates and overall success rates
in these cases varied substantially across regions. Hungarian principal applicants
succeeded twice as often in Western Canada (11.8%) compared to applicants
in Central Canada (5.8%) and 2.7 times as often in Eastern Canada (15.8%)
compared to Central Canada (5.8%). Of course, one should be cautious about
inferring that the variations are caused by regional differences in decision-making
practices, as there could be a number of other factors at play. That being said, the
large variations do raise questions about whether a case that would succeed in one
region may nonetheless fail in another.
Negative***

Positive

Total

Recognition
Rate (Merits)
(%)

DUCHEINE, VIVIANE
(Montreal)

6

21

27

77.8

MASON, LESLEY (Toronto)

14

14

28

50.0

BAFARO, ROBERT (Toronto)

30

15

45

33.3

LOWE, DAVID (Toronto)

35

13

48

27.1

ATKINSON, KEN (Toronto)

56

20

76

26.3

BADOWSKI, JOHN (Toronto)

23

8

31

25.8

MCCAFFREY, MICHAEL
(Toronto)

39

13

52

25.0

KULAR, SUSAN (Toronto)

44

9

53

17.0

AHARA, ROSLYN (Toronto)

101

16

117

13.7

PAQUETTE-NEVILLE,
LOUISE (Toronto)

53

8

61

13.1

MCMILLAN, KAREN (Toronto)

21

3

24

12.5

AGOSTINHO, LUIS F.
(Toronto)

37

4

41

9.8

Board Member**
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TABLE 6: BOARD MEMBERS (20+ CASES ) IN PRINCIPAL APPLICANT FINAL RPD
DECISIONS FOR HUNGARIAN CLAIMANTS, BY RECOGNITION RATE (MERITS
ONLY) (2008-2012)*
GREENSIDE, PATRICIA
(Toronto)

20

2

22

9.1

CRYER, DOUGLAS (Toronto)

72

6

78

7.7

FIORINO, PASQUALE A.
(Toronto)

68

4

72

5.6

ROBINSON, PAUL (Toronto)

26

1

27

3.7

BRYCHCY, ANNA (Montreal)

35

1

36

2.8

ROSE, ELANA NANCY
(Toronto)

39

1

40

2.5

MCBEAN, DAVID (Toronto)

24

0

24

0.0

ROBINSON, EDWARD
(Toronto)

49

0

49

0.0

PETTINELLA, MICHELE
(Toronto)

96

0

96

0.0

Other Board Members (1-19
Cases)

215

77

292

26.4

1,103

236

1,339

17.6

Total

SOURCE: IRB ATIP Request No. A-2013-01523
*
Excluding cases with outcomes other than negative, positive, abandonded and withdrawn
** Reflects names listed in the IRB database without consolidation of multiple listings for
individual Board Member names
*** Includes negative, no credible basis decisions

Table 6 provides details on the outcomes in principal applicant Hungarian
refugee claims finalized on their merits between 2008 and 2012, broken down by
deciding IRB Member. As illustrated in the table, 21 IRB Members deciding at
least 20 cases each adjudicated the large majority (78.2%) of these cases. The table
also shows very large variations in recognition rates depending on which IRB
Member decided the case, even when only comparing IRB Members working in
the same office. In the Toronto office, for example, claimants were in luck if their
cases were assigned to Lesley Mason (50.0%, 28 cases), Robert Barafo (33.3%,
45 cases), or even David Lowe (27.1%, 48 cases). However, they were decidedly
unlucky if their cases were assigned to Michelle Pettinella (0%, 96 cases), Edward
Robinson (0%, 49 cases), or David McBean (0%, 24 cases).
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Given these dramatic variations in grant rates between decision makers in
the same office hearing claims from the same country, we think there are good
reasons to worry that outcomes in some cases depended to some degree on who
was assigned to hear the case. This obviously raises serious fairness concerns.
G. QUALITY OF COUNSEL

Fairness problems in Hungarian Romani refugee claims are not, however, related
solely to the actions of government officials or institutions such as the IRB. Some
of these problems instead involve professionals who are supposed to act in the
best interests of refugee claimants. Indeed, all ten of our interviewees expressed
serious concerns about quality of counsel in Hungarian Romani refugee claims.
The following comments are typical:
[M]any lawyers make quite a big deal about who are the refugee judges, the process,
the panel members, all that. But I think the single most important thing is the
lawyers.224
[…]
There were some counsel who took a large number of claims [and] poorly prepared
them … . I think that could go a long way as well to explaining the low approval
rate.225
[…]
[T]here seemed to be representatives who … were not interested in … doing a good
job or in truthfully or honestly representing the clients.226
[…]
[T]here are some really terrible lawyers out there.227

The interviewees also largely agreed about the specific types of quality of
counsel issues that arose in Hungarian Romani refugee claims. Many of these
issues related to claimant narratives, key documents submitted early in the refugee
determination process that set out the claimant’s account of his or her fears of
persecution. All ten interviewees indicated that some lawyers prepared inadequate
narratives for Hungarian Romani clients, often by including brief boilerplate
narratives that failed to address central aspects of the claims. Interviewees also
reported that lawyers frequently left claimants to prepare their own narratives
224.
225.
226.
227.

Interviews, supra note 199 at 107 (Interview 10).
Ibid at 4 (Interview 1).
Ibid at 83 (Interview 7).
Ibid at 33 (Interview 3).
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without adequate instruction,228 asked clients to sign blank narratives,229 and failed
to review narratives with clients prior to submitting them.230 Some interviewees
also suggested that other supporting documents (such as country-conditions
information, medical reports, and police reports) were not submitted despite
being provided to counsel231 and that counsel failed to instruct clients on what
types of supporting documents they should seek out.232
Another common set of quality of counsel concerns raised by our interviewees
related to how lawyers set up their practice. Several interviewees, for example,
expressed concern about high volumes of cases taken on by some lawyers.233
Many also suggested that lawyers relied excessively on non-lawyer assistants
(including translators or consultants) or on inexperienced junior lawyers.234 In
addition, some interviewees reported that clients were often unable to reach their
lawyers,235 were not adequately prepared by their lawyers for their hearings,236 or
never met with their lawyers until their refugee hearings.237 Some also indicated
that lawyers failed to even show up at hearings.238
We were curious about whether these concerns about quality of counsel
were shared by the IRB, so we made an access to information request seeking
records that referred to quality of counsel or inadequate representation involving
Hungarian refugee claims during the period of our study.239 The IRB provided
over 1,000 pages of various types of documents responsive to our request. Among
these documents were emails written by decision makers and staff at the IRB
outlining problematic behaviour of counsel. For example, in the context of
allegations about a law firm allegedly failing to forward important documents
to the IRB, a staff member asked whether a complaint should be made about
the “mismanagement” of the firm and noted that decision makers “often run
into problems stemming [from] the firm’s internal administration.”240 Similarly,
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Ibid (Interviews 2, 8-9).
Ibid (Interviews 2, 10).
Ibid (Interviews 8-9).
Ibid (Interviews 3, 6).
Ibid (Interview 1).
Ibid (Interviews 3, 6, 8-9).
Ibid (Interviews 2-6, 8).
Ibid (Interviews 1, 6, 8).
Ibid (Interviews 1-3, 9).
Ibid (Interviews 1, 3-6, 8).
Ibid (Interviews 2, 6).
Immigration and Refugee Board, Access to Information and Privacy Request No
A-2013-00619 [on file with authors].
240. Ibid at 474.
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an email from an IRB Member described a hearing that had been postponed
because of allegations of inadequate counsel. These allegations included many of
the concerns about narratives raised by our interviewees. The email concludes:
“As you know this has happened repeatedly on the Hungarian claims. …
I have heard a number of times that the [narrative] is not one the claimants
have seen. It is evident to me from the [narratives] that a template is being used
over and over.”241 In addition to electronic correspondence, the IRB provided
us with other documents detailing steps taken to reduce delays in the refugee
determination process caused by problematic counsel in Hungarian cases242 as
well as documents from many Hungarian refugee claims featuring allegations of
inadequate counsel.243

241. Ibid at 1231.
242. Ibid at 1232, 1244.
243. See e.g. ibid at 668 (RPD File No TB0-11190); ibid at 729 (RPD File No TA9-22821); ibid
at 791 (RPD File No TA9-21368); ibid at 886 (RPD File No TB0-17436); ibid at 887 (RPD
File No TB0-03861); ibid at 906 (FPD File No TB0-05610); ibid at 1023 (RPD File No
TB1-17415); ibid at 1116 (RPD File No TB1-10802).

244. Rehaag, “Role of Counsel,” supra note 149.
364
295
93
38
430
1,995

51-200 (8 Counsel)
11-50 Cases (30
Counsel)
2-10 Cases (76 Counsel)
1 Case (106 Counsel)
No Counsel Listed
Total

1,103

129

51

148

268

202

305

Negative
***

236

12

17

41

60

47

59

Positive

3,334

571

106

282

623

613

1,139

Total

17.6

8.5

25.0

21.7

18.3

18.9

16.2

Recognition
Rate (Merits)
(%)

59.8

75.3

35.8

33.0

47.4

59.4

68.0

Abandoned /
Withdrawn
Rate (%)

SOURCE: IRB ATIP Request No. A-2013-01523
*
Excluding cases with outcomes other than negative, positive, abandonded and withdrawn
** Reflects actual names listed in the IRB database without consolidation of multiple listings for
individual counsel names
*** Includes negative, no credible basis decisions

775

Abandoned /
Withdrawn

201+ Cases (3 Counsel)

Counsel Volume
Category**

7.1

2.1

16.0

14.5

9.6

7.7

5.2

Overall
Success
Rate (%)

TABLE 7: VOLUME CATEGORIES FOR COUNSEL OF RECORD AND OUTCOMES IN PRINCIPAL APPLICANT
FINAL RPD DECISIONS FOR HUNGARIAN CLAIMANTS (2008-2012)*
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Prior research based on data obtained from the IRB through access to
information procedures suggests that securing counsel—and in particular
securing a lawyer with refugee law experience—is correlated with increased
success rates in Canada’s refugee determination system.244 According to this
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research, refugee claimants with lawyers were more successful from 2005 to
2009 than claimants who were represented by immigration consultants or who
were unrepresented.245 Similarly, claimants who were represented by experienced
refugee lawyers—measured in terms of the number of claims in which they served
as counsel of record during the period of the study—succeeded more frequently
than claimants represented by less experienced counsel.246
The present study employed a similar methodology. Using information
obtained from the IRB for counsel of record listed in all Hungarian principal
applicant refugee claims finalized between 2008 and 2012, we examined whether
outcomes varied depending on who served as counsel of record. In contrast
to the findings from the earlier study, we found that success rates were higher
when counsel of record worked on relatively few Hungarian claims compared to
counsel who worked on large numbers of such claims. For example, as Table 7
shows, claimants represented by counsel involved in 10 or fewer Hungarian cases
succeeded 2.9 times as frequently as claimants represented by counsel in 201 or
more Hungarian cases. The table also shows that a small number of high-volume
lawyers were involved in a substantial proportion of Hungarian refugee claims
decided in this period: 34.2% of these cases involved just three counsel and
52.5% involved eight counsel.
Tables 8 and 9 break down the success rates for individual counsel of record
who were involved in at least 25 Hungarian principal applicant refugee claims
between 2008 and 2012. As these tables show, the success rates of individual
counsel in Hungarian cases vary greatly, even when comparing counsel working
in a single province. For example, in Ontario, Jeffrey Goldman (25.8%, 31 cases),
Maureen Silcoff (13.5%, 52 cases), and Peter Ivanyi (10.8%, 249 cases) succeeded
far more frequently than Elizabeth Jaszi (1.1%, 95 cases), Viktor Hohots (1.2%,
504 cases), and Djawid Taheri (1.4%, 73 cases). Of course, as with variations
in recognition rates across IRB offices, one should be cautious about drawing
inferences about the causes of these variations—and in particular about whether
differences in counsel success rates are a product of differing quality of legal
representation. We acknowledge that there are many factors that might produce

245. Ibid at 86-87.
246. Ibid at 88-89.

403
223
149
66
70
80
18
65
25
16
24
20

(2) FARKAS, JOSEPH (ON) (LSUC
Hearing)

(3) IVANYI, PETER (ON)

(4) BHATTI, ROGER (BC)

(5) FINE, DANIEL (ON)

(6) JASZI, ELIZABETH (ON) (LSUC
Hearing)

(7) YOUNES, DIANA (ON)

(8) TAHERI, DJAWID (ON)

(9) KORMAN, MICHAEL (ON)

(10) SILCOFF, MAUREEN (ON)

(11) RODRIGUES, ROGER (ON)

(12) VALLIERES, ALAIN (QC)

Abandoned /
Withdrawn

(1) HOHOTS, VIKTOR (ON) (LSUC
Hearing)

Counsel**

12

24

29

28

7

51

14

18

31

73

137

95

Negative
***

8

4

7

2

1

6

1

9

17

27

26

6

Positive

40

52

52

55

73

75

95

97

114

249

386

504

Total

40.0

14.3

19.4

6.7

12.5

10.5

6.7

33.3

35.4

27.0

16.0

5.9

Recognition
Rate (Merits)
(%)

50.0

46.2

30.8

45.5

89.0

24.0

84.2

72.2

57.9

59.8

57.8

80.0

Abandoned /
Withdrawn
Rate (%)

20.0

7.7

13.5

3.6

1.4

8.0

1.1

9.3

14.9

10.8

6.7

1.2

Overall
Success
Rate (%)

TABLE 8: HIGH VOLUME (25+ DECISIONS) COUNSEL OF RECORD AND OUTCOMES IN PRINCIPAL APPLICANT FINAL RPD
DECISIONS FOR HUNGARIAN CLAIMANTS, BY VOLUME (2008-2012)*
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10

(19) SARKOZI, JOZEF (ON) (Consultant)

1,103

129

371

13

15

14

23

7

3

9

236

12

78

2

2

8

1

1

11

7

3,334

571

741

25

31

31

33

34

36

40

17.6

8.5

17.4

13.3

11.8

36.4

4.2

12.5

78.6

43.8

59.8

75.3

39.4

40.0

45.2

29.0

27.3

76.5

61.1

60.0

SOURCE: IRB ATIP Request No. A-2013-01523
*
Excluding cases decided on grounds other than negative, positive, and abandonded / withdrawn
** Reflects actual names listed in the IRB database without consolodation of multiple listings for individual counsel names
*** Includes negative, no credible basis decisions

1,995

14

(18) HEGYI, ILDIKO (ON) (Consultant)

Total

9

(17) GOLDMAN, JEFFREY (ON)

430

9

(16) WANG, YAQIAN (ON)

No Counsel Listed

26

(15) GRICE, JOHN (ON)

292

22

(14) MANZARARU, LEONARD (QC)

Other Counsel (Fewer than 25 Cases)

24

(13) VALOIS, STEPHANIE (QC)

7.1

2.1

10.5

8.0

6.5

25.8

3.0

2.9

30.6

17.5

TABLE 8: HIGH VOLUME (25+ DECISIONS) COUNSEL OF RECORD AND OUTCOMES IN PRINCIPAL APPLICANT FINAL RPD
DECISIONS FOR HUNGARIAN CLAIMANTS, BY VOLUME (2008-2012)*
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22
9
20
24
66
16
149
70
18
10
24
223

(17) GOLDMAN, JEFFREY (ON)

(12) VALLIERES, ALAIN (QC)

(13) VALOIS, STEPHANIE (QC)

(4) BHATTI, ROGER (BC)

(10) SILCOFF, MAUREEN (ON)

(3) IVANYI, PETER (ON)

(5) FINE, DANIEL (ON)

(7) YOUNES, DIANA (ON)

(19) SARKOZI, JOZEF (ON) (Consultant)

(11) RODRIGUES, ROGER (ON)

(2) FARKAS, JOSEPH (ON) (LSUC
Hearing)

Abandoned /
Withdrawn

(14) MANZARARU, LEONARD (QC)

Counsel**

137

24

13

51

18

73

29

31

9

12

14

3

Negative
***

26

4

2

6

9

27

7

17

7

8

8

11

Positive

386

52

25

75

97

249

52

114

40

40

31

36

Total

16.0

14.3

13.3

10.5

33.3

27.0

19.4

35.4

43.8

40.0

36.4

78.6

Recognition
Rate (Merits)
(%)

57.8

46.2

40.0

24.0

72.2

59.8

30.8

57.9

60.0

50.0

29.0

61.1

Abandoned /
Withdrawn
Rate (%)

6.7

7.7

8.0

8.0

9.3

10.8

13.5

14.9

17.5

20.0

25.8

30.6

Overall
Success
Rate (%)

TABLE 9: HIGH VOLUME (25+ DECISIONS) COUNSEL OF RECORD AND OUTCOMES IN PRINCIPAL APPLICANT FINAL RPD
DECISIONS FOR HUNGARIAN CLAIMANTS, BY OVERALL SUCCESS RATE (2008-2012)*
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25
9
26
65
403
80
292
430
1,995

(9) KORMAN, MICHAEL (ON)

(16) WANG, YAQIAN (ON)

(15) GRICE, JOHN (ON)

(8) TAHERI, DJAWID (ON)

(1) HOHOTS, VIKTOR (ON) (LSUC
Hearing)

(6) JASZI, ELIZABETH (ON) (LSUC
Hearing)

Other counsel (fewer than 25 cases)

No counsel listed

Total

1,103

129

371

14

95

7

7

23

28

15

236

12

78

1

6

1

1

1

2

2

3,334

571

741

95

504

73

34

33

55

31

17.6

8.5

17.4

6.7

5.9

12.5

12.5

4.2

6.7

11.8

59.8

75.3

39.4

84.2

80.0

89.0

76.5

27.3

45.5

45.2

SOURCE: IRB ATIP Request No. A-2013-01523
*
Excluding cases decided on grounds other than negative, positive, and abandonded / withdrawn
** Reflects actual names listed in the IRB database without consolodation of multiple listings for individual counsel names
*** Includes negative, no credible basis decisions

14

(18) HEGYI, ILDIKO (ON) (Consultant)

7.1

2.1

10.5

1.1

1.2

1.4

2.9

3.0

3.6

6.5

TABLE 9: HIGH VOLUME (25+ DECISIONS) COUNSEL OF RECORD AND OUTCOMES IN PRINCIPAL APPLICANT FINAL RPD
DECISIONS FOR HUNGARIAN CLAIMANTS, BY OVERALL SUCCESS RATE (2008-2012)*
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these variations. Nonetheless, the combination of below-average success rates and
very high volumes of cases does, in our view, raise serious concerns.247
Another troubling finding evident in Tables 8 and 9 is that three of the six
highest-volume lawyers (including the two highest-volume lawyers) are currently
facing disciplinary proceedings at the Law Society of Upper Canada (“LSUC”).
Taken together these three lawyers were listed as counsel of record in 29.6% of the
Hungarian principal applicant refugee claims finalized between 2008 and 2012.
All three have below-average success rates in Hungarian claims, and two (Viktor
Hohots and Elizabeth Jaszi) have the lowest overall success rates in Hungarian
claims of all lawyers listed as counsel of record in at least 25 such claims. The main
allegations against all three lawyers in the LSUC proceedings involve inadequate
legal service provided to multiple refugee claimant clients. Viktor Hohots and
Elizabeth Jaszi are accused of, among other things, failing to properly prepare
documents submitted by refugee claimants (especially narratives setting out the
basis of claims), asking claimants to sign blank documents, missing deadlines,
failing to prepare clients for their refugee hearings, and failing to keep clients
advised as to the status of their files.248 Joseph Farkas is accused of having failed
to properly supervise a non-lawyer who prepared refugee claims in his office and
of failing to properly serve several refugee claimant clients.249
It should be emphasized that, as of the time of writing, the allegations in these
disciplinary proceedings have not been proven. However, in Galyas v Canada
(MCI), the Federal Court found that the highest-volume lawyer, Viktor Hohots,
provided incompetent counsel.250 Specifically, the court found that Mr. Hohots’s
law office provided incompetent legal counsel in submitting a vague and very
brief narrative in a Hungarian Romani refugee claim:
[T]here can be no disputing the inadequacies that appear on the face of the …
narrative … . Competent counsel would have known that the Applicant’s narrative
247. There is also cause for concern regarding some lower volume counsel. There are 30 counsel
who are each listed as counsel of record in 11 to 24 Hungarian principal applicants refugee
claims finalized between 2008 and 2010. Of these, 10 did not succeed with a single case,
whereas 3 had success rates over 25%.
248. The Law Society of Upper Canada v Viktor Serhey Hohots (21 February 2014), Ontario, Law
Society Hearing Panel File No LCN 22/14 (amended notice of application) [on file with
authors]; The Law Society of Upper Canada v Erzsebet Jaszi (29 May 2015), Ontario, Law
Society Tribunal Hearing Division File No LCN 57/14 (amended notice of application)
[Jaszi] [on file with authors].
249. The Law Society of Upper Canada v Joseph Stephen Farkas (10 July 2013), Ontario,
Law Society Hearing Panel File No LCN 83/13 (notice of application) [Farkas] [on
file with authors].
250. Galyas, supra note 196.
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does not comply with … expectations … and that it would be extremely detrimental
to the Applicant at the hearing. … [The IRB] consistently and relentlessly draws
negative credibility findings from a failure to include important incidents … . In
that regard, the Applicant’s [narrative] is a negative credibility finding waiting to
happen.251
TABLE 10: WORD COUNTS IN NARRATIVES FOR SAMPLES OF HUNGARIAN
PRINCIPAL APPLICANT RPD DECISIONS ON MERITS (2008-2012)*
Samples

Number of Cases in
Average Word
Sample
Count in Narratives

(1) HOHOTS, VIKTOR (ON) (LSUC Hearing)

23

487

(2) FARKAS, JOSEPH (ON) (LSUC Hearing)

25

529

(3) IVANYI, PETER (ON)

22

1,938

(4) BHATTI, ROGER (BC)

24

1,463

(5) All Counsel Hungary Sample

45

1,131

All Counsel Hungary Sample (Positive)

10

1,633

All Counsel Hungary Sample (Negative)

35

987

SOURCE: IRB ATIP Request No. A-2013-00779
*
Five separate samples. Samples 1-4 were 25 narratives each, selected randomly from among
Hungarian cases decided on the merits where the relevant counsel was listed as counsel of
record. Sample 5 was 50 narratives randomly selected from all Hungarian cases decided on
the merits. Not all requested narratives were provided (i.e. 2 missing from Hohots sample,
3 missing from Ivanyi sample, 2 missing from Bhatti sample, and 5 missing from All
Counsel sample).

Because of the frequent concerns expressed about the quality of narratives
submitted by high-volume counsel in Hungarian claims, we made an access
to information request to obtain copies of narratives submitted in samples of
Hungarian refugee claims.252 Table 10 sets out the word counts in five samples.
The first four samples were randomly selected from Hungarian cases in which
251. Ibid at para 86. See also Ivancsik et al v The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, (6 June
2014), Canada, FC IMM-2553-13 (Respondent’s memorandum of agreement) [on file
with authors] (where the Department of Justice conceded that several high-volume lawyers,
including Viktor Hohots and Elizabeth Jaszi, provided incompetent counsel).
252. Immigration and Refugee Board, Access to Information and Privacy Request No
A-2013-00779 [on file with authors].
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the four highest-volume counsel were listed as counsel of record, and the fifth
sample was randomly selected from all Hungarian principal applicant cases,
irrespective of who was listed as counsel of record. As is evident in the table, the
narratives submitted in cases where Viktor Hohots or Joseph Farkas was listed as
counsel were very brief (509 words on average), as compared to the narratives in
cases where Peter Ivanyi or Roger Bhatti was listed as counsel (1,690 words on
average). This is a point of some concern, given that Hohots and Farkas are facing
LSUC disciplinary proceedings for, among other things, submitting inadequate
narratives. The table also indicates that, in our sample of Hungarian cases with
all counsel, positive cases had on average much longer narratives (1,633 words)
than negative cases (987 words).
In addition to these troubling quantitative findings, we must say that we were
unimpressed with the quality of large numbers of narratives in our samples. In
particular, we believe that most of the brief narratives suffer from the same flaws
that led the Federal Court to call the narrative submitted in Galyas inadequate
on its face. Indeed, many of these narratives appear to have been prepared with
complete disregard for what would need to be established at a refugee hearing in
order for a claimant to succeed. Most of the brief narratives fail to address what steps
claimants took to try to obtain state protection against persecution in Hungary,
or alternatively, why they reasonably believed that taking such steps would be
futile. As such, these narratives make it extremely difficult for the claimant to
rebut the presumption of state protection, which—as we saw above—is the main
reason offered by the IRB for rejecting Hungarian Romani refugee claims. Most
of the brief narratives also fail to set out in sufficient detail the mistreatment
suffered by the claimants, even though they hint at such mistreatment. Therefore,
they are likely to result in a finding that the claimants suffered discrimination
rather than persecution, which is, as we saw above, another common reason for
the IRB to reject Hungarian Romani refugee claims. Finally, most of the brief
narratives contain allegations that are vague and incomplete, and are thus, to
use the Federal Court’s words in Galyas, “negative credibility finding[s] waiting
to happen.”253 In other words, most of the brief narratives we reviewed were
inadequate to the task that any experienced counsel should have known would
be central to success in the claim: rebutting the presumption of state protection,
demonstrating that the claimant faced persecution rather than discrimination,
and establishing that the claimant is credible.
Based both on the patterns in success rates and on our review of the samples
of narratives, we are of the view that there was a serious and systemic problem
253. Galyas, supra note 196 at para 86.
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regarding quality of counsel in large numbers of Hungarian Romani refugee
claims during the period of our study. In particular, many narratives were
prepared by counsel in a manner that virtually guaranteed that the refugee claims
would fail. We therefore agree with all of our interviewees that quality of counsel
likely played a role in the very low success rates for Hungarian Romani refugee
claimants between 2008 and 2012.
H. ABANDONED AND WITHDRAWN CLAIMS

A final aspect of Hungarian Romani refugee claims made in Canada between
2008 and 2012 that we would like to explore is the frequency of withdrawn or
abandoned claims—the former meaning that claimants actively asked the IRB to
discontinue their claims and the latter that the IRB declared claims abandoned
after claimants failed to complete a mandatory step in the process. During the
period of this study, withdrawal and abandonment rates in Hungarian Romani
claims played a prominent role in debates both about these claims and about
Canada’s refugee determination system more generally. For example, in 2010,
Minister Kenney spoke in Parliament about the need for reforms to Canada’s
refugee determination system:
[T]he system … is broken … with our number one source country [i.e., Hungary],
a European Union democracy, from which 97% of claimants go on to abandon or
withdraw their own claims. Therefore, it is imperative that we find a way to deter
abuse … [of ] Canada’s generosity.254

Similarly, in another
Minister Kenney said:

statement

in

Parliament

the

same

year,

[Hungary] has become our number one source country for asylum claims. Ninetyseven per cent … go on to abandon or withdraw their claims after they are filed
saying by their own admission that they actually do not need Canada’s protection
… . Of the 3% of claims that went on to adjudication at the IRB, three, not 3%,
but three of the 2,500 asylum claims from Hungary were accepted as being in need
of protection. That is an acceptance rate of nearly 0%.255

These statistics frequently cited by Minister Kenney were misleading. The full
figures are available in Table 1 in Part II(B), above. As can be seen in this table, the
Minister was correct to say that, in 2009, the abandonment and withdrawal rate
was 97% of finalized Hungarian decisions and that only three of all the finalized
Hungarian claims succeeded. However, he neglected to mention that the IRB
254. House of Commons Debates, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, No 63 (15 June 2010) at 1515.
255. House of Commons Debates, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, No 36 (29 April 2010) at 1110.
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chose to hold hearings on the merits in only eight Hungarian cases in 2009—and
that three of those eight cases succeeded. That means that the recognition rate for
Hungarian refugee claims decided on the merits in 2009 was 37.5%. Moreover,
if one looks at the recognition rates from the year before, when more Hungarian
cases were decided on their merits, Hungarian claimants succeeded in 62.9%
of cases decided on the merits. This is a far cry from the “acceptance rate of
nearly 0%” cited by the Minister. And, of the approximately 2,500 cases from
Hungary before the IRB in 2009, only 267 (around 10%) were withdrawn or
abandoned that year. The rest were simply pending. In other words, the statistics
that the Minister frequently pointed to as evidence of abuse of Canada’s refugee
determination system by Hungarian claimants were themselves “bogus.”
Still, as we have acknowledged, a large proportion (52.5%) of the 7,669
Hungarian refugee claims finalized between 2008 and 2012 were withdrawn or
abandoned. This is much higher than the average abandonment or withdrawal
rate for claims from all countries finalized during the same period (18.3%). As
a result, any serious analysis of Hungarian Romani refugee claims during this
period must address this phenomenon.
We put the question of what accounts for high abandonment and withdrawal
rates to our interviewees. The most frequent explanation our interviewees offered
was that, confronted with very low success rates for Hungarian refugee claimants
reported in the media, many claimants lost hope that their claims would be
successful and decided that it was not worth waiting for the refugee determination
process to run its course.256 As one interviewee put it: “I’ve talked to people who
just gave up hope. … [T]hey just said look, ‘we’ve seen the statistics, we’ve read
the newspapers, we’ve heard and there’s no hope for us here.’”257
Several interviewees also suggested that this sense of hopelessness was
compounded by Minister Kenney’s negative comments about Hungarian refugee
claimants.258 For example, one interviewee explained that “[t]wo and a half years
is a long time to wait for a hearing in an environment where the Minister’s saying
you’re bogus, we’re going to reject you anyway … .”259 Another interviewee went
further, saying:
What encouraged people to give up was the language of people being called bogus
refugees and criminals, because they felt they weren’t accepted or wanted in Canada,

256.
257.
258.
259.

Interviews, supra note 199 (Interviews 1, 3-7, 10).
Ibid at 108 (Interview 10).
Ibid (Interviews 2, 4-6, 10).
Ibid at 45 (Interview 4).
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that they were being essentially treated the same way as they were being treated back
home in Hungary … .260

Another set of reasons that our interviewees offered for claims being withdrawn
or abandoned related to counsel, including some of the concerns around quality
of counsel addressed previously in Part II(G), above.261 For example:
[The] biggest reason that I see … [was] lawyers and immigration consultants not
doing their job in terms of helping prepare people for their claims … . … [I]t seems
like they just abandon them … .262
[…]
[L]ack of communication with the lawyers might have made people feel that there’s
no hope for the case, that no one’s really helping them, that their cases aren’t seen
as worthwhile.263
[…]
[T]hey were treated [badly] by lawyers or by professionals, that was often times
very, very discouraging and very sad, and they decided to go back.264

These concerns about counsel seem consistent with our quantitative data. As
can be seen in Table 7, above, claimants with high-volume counsel abandoned
or withdrew their claims more frequently than claimants with lower-volume
counsel (e.g., 68.0% for counsel in 201 or more Hungarian cases compared to
33.0% for counsel in 2–10 Hungarian cases). Moreover, as is evident in Tables
8 and 9, abandonment and withdrawal rates for individual high-volume lawyers
vary dramatically. For instance, the three high-volume counsel currently facing
LSUC disciplinary proceedings—Elizabeth Jaszi (84.2%, 95 cases), Viktor
Hohots (80.0%, 504 cases), and Joseph Farkas (57.8%, 386 cases)—had much
higher abandonment and withdrawal rates than other high-volume counsel, such
as Jeffrey Goldman (29.0%, 31 cases) and Maureen Silcoff (30.8%, 52 cases).
Moreover, the three high-volume lawyers facing LSUC disciplinary proceedings
served as counsel of record in 35.4% of all abandoned and withdrawn Hungarian
refugee claims between 2008 and 2012. Once again, as with the data on IRB
Member grant rates and the data on counsel success rates, we would caution that
there are possible confounding variables here: Many factors, including factors
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Ibid at 74 (Interview 6).
Interviews, supra note 199 (Interviews 1, 2, 6-8, 10).
Ibid at 74 (Interview 6).
Ibid at 22 (Interview 2).
Ibid at 92 (Interview 8).
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related to how clients select their counsel, might explain why some counsel have
higher abandonment and withdrawal rates than others that may have nothing to
do with quality of counsel. That having been said, in our view—and in light of
our conclusions in Part II(G), above—these figures provide further reason to be
worried that quality of counsel may have played a role in the large numbers of
Hungarian refugee claims withdrawn or abandoned during the period of our study.
In addition to a sense of hopelessness and concerns about quality of counsel,
our interviewees also pointed to a variety of other reasons that Hungarian
claimants abandoned or withdrew claims. These included: difficult living
conditions in Canada that did not live up to the claimants’ expectations,265
homesickness,266 and culture shock.267 Several of the reasons offered involved
concerns about family. For example, one interviewee reported that claimants
withdrew or abandoned their claims after other family members were deported
from Canada.268 Along similar lines, another interviewee suggested that claimants
withdrew or abandoned claims because they needed to return to Hungary to deal
with the illness or death of family members.269
Finally, a number of our interviewees pointed out that many Hungarian
Romani refugee claimants who abandoned or withdrew claims did not ultimately
move back to Hungary but instead went to other EU countries270—even if,
as noted earlier in this article, their legal status in these countries might have
been precarious.
Taken together, we think the phenomenon of high abandonment and
withdrawal rates (but not as high as misleadingly suggested by Minister Kenney)
is more complex than Minister Kenney’s assertions about these claims being
“bogus” would have it. There were a variety of reasons why claimants may have
withdrawn or abandoned their claims that have little to do with whether the
claimants did, in fact, have a well-founded fear of persecution in Hungary—
not the least of which is what one of our interviewees called Minister Kenney’s
“campaign against refugees and particularly Roma refugees.”271

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Interviews, supra note 199 (Interviews 6, 9).
Ibid (Interview 7).
Ibid (Interview 6).
Ibid (Interview 1).
Ibid (Interview 6).
Ibid (Interviews 8-10).
Ibid at 64 (Interview 5).
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III. CONCLUSION
As this study has shown, over 11,000 Hungarians made refugee claims in Canada
between 2008 and 2012, primarily on the basis that they feared persecution
on account of their Romani ethnicity. While hundreds succeeded with their
refugee claims, most did not. Instead, they encountered racist rhetoric that drew
on stereotypes about Roma being fraudsters, beggars, and criminals and which
presented Hungarian Romani refugee claimants as “bogus.” These stereotypes
have now been enshrined in Canada’s new refugee determination process, which
limits the procedural and substantive rights of refugee claimants from DCOs—
including Hungary—on the theory that asylum seekers from these countries are
taking advantage of Canadian generosity.
Our study has also found that Hungarian Romani refugee claimants in
Canada between 2008 and 2012 encountered a refugee determination process
for which there are reasons to be concerned about institutional bias. The same
refugee determination process also appears to have been unable to deliver
consistent decision making, and there is good reason to fear that outcomes came
down to the luck of the draw in terms of which decision maker was assigned to
hear the case. Moreover, many Hungarian Romani refugee claimants entrusted
their refugee claims to lawyers for whom there are reasons to be concerned about
the quality of services they provided.
In short, between 2008 and 2012, most Hungarian Romani refugee claimants
found no refuge in Canada from the mistreatment they experienced in Hungary.
We want to be clear that we are not suggesting that all Hungarian Roma
who made refugee claims during the period of our study actually met the refugee
definition as it stands currently in Canada’s refugee determination system. We
recognize that this definition involves constraining legal tests and that not all
Hungarian Romani refugee claims are able to meet these tests.
That having been said, we think it is obvious that Roma have been mistreated
in Hungary for centuries and that they continue to be a severely marginalized
minority. Even if, due to the narrowness of the refugee definition, some
Hungarian Romani refugee claimants were not entitled to refugee protection
in Canada during the period of our study, they were nonetheless entitled to a
fair refugee determination process. They should have received high-quality legal
assistance, and, perhaps most importantly, they should not have been made the
target of anti-refugee rhetoric on the part of government actors and others.
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One of our interviewees offered this reflection on her experience
accompanying the latest stream of Hungarian Roma as they made their refugee
claims in Canada between 2008 and 2012:
It’s just heart-breaking. … You see the wreckage of families, the terrible uncertainties
that they face, the attendant health questions, the breakdowns, the stress, the waste
of years of people’s lives. But I think the worst part for me is to see a whole group
of people that have never experienced justice and they have this one little hope that
Canada might be a place of justice and that is crushed. Then they say, well, that’s
how we’ve always been treated, and how we always will. And that’s a terrible, terrible
thing.272

We think Canada needs to learn from the experience of the latest stream
of Hungarian Romani refugee claimants. The lesson to be learned, however, is
not the one often cited by proponents of Canada’s new refugee determination
system. Instead, the lesson to be learned is that Canada still has some distance
to go to fully embrace respect for the human rights of those seeking refuge
from hatred, racism, and xenophobia.273 When the next stream of Hungarian
Roma—or another marginalized group—come to Canada seeking refuge, the
country must do better. Unfortunately, the recent changes to Canada’s refugee
determination system—changes that political actors justified with reference to
the need to crack down on “bogus” Hungarian Romani refugee claims—do not
give much cause for hope.

IV. AFTERWORD
After this article was written, one of the LSUC disciplinary proceedings
involving lawyer Viktor Hohots—who took on a high volume of cases from
2008 to 2012—was decided. On 23 February 2015, in an agreed statement of
272. Ibid at 113 (Interview 10).
273. In 2011, Minister Kenney attended the unveiling of Daniel Libeskind’s Wheel of Conscience
at Canada’s immigration museum at Pier 21 in Halifax. The Wheel of Conscience is a
memorial to Jews fleeing the Nazi regime onboard the MS. St. Louis, who were turned
away from Canada in 1939—many of whom were killed in the Holocaust. The Wheel of
Conscience attempts to show interconnections between hatred, racism, xenophobia, and
anti-Semitism, which led to Canada’s failure to assist Jews fleeing the Nazis. At the unveiling,
Minister Kenney said: “We dedicate ourselves to teaching future generations about the
injustices and xenophobia of our own history, and to ensuring that they are never repeated.”
See Jason Kenney, “The Unveiling, at Pier 21, of The Wheel of Conscience, a Monument
to Commemorate the MS St Louis” (Speech delivered in Halifax, 20 January 2011),
online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada <www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/
speeches/2011/2011-01-20.asp>.
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facts, Hohots admitted to professional misconduct regarding several Hungarian
Romani refugee claimant clients.274 The agreed statement of facts also indicated
that, from 2009 to 2012, Hohots had around nine hundred refugee families
as clients (representing around four thousand to five thousand individuals) and
that he “felt overwhelmed by the demands of his refugee practice.”275 Four junior
lawyers that he employed during this period—one of whom quit within two
weeks of starting at the firm—also expressed concerns about the firm.276
In a decision issued on 23 April 2015, the LSUC Tribunal found that
Hohots had committed professional misconduct by failing to effectively supervise
non-lawyers in his office and by failing to competently serve approximately
twenty refugee claimants—and specifically, failing to prepare adequate narratives
and failing to adequately prepare clients for their hearings.277 In coming to this
conclusion, the Tribunal noted that Hohots “conducted a high-volume refugee
law practice in which there were systemic failures in the operation of the office.
… The result was a pattern of conduct in which a large number of the Lawyer’s
clients received inadequate service.”278 The Tribunal also found that Hohots
“failed to meet virtually all the attributes of a competent lawyer.”279
A penalty hearing was held on 11 May 2015. At that hearing, the tribunal
heard two motions for leave to intervene. The first involved Legal Aid Ontario
(“LAO”), which argued that LAO had a direct interest in the proceedings because
many of the clients who Hohots served were funded by LAO. In addition, LAO
argued that it could provide helpful contextual information about Hohots’s legal
aid practices and his billing information.280 The second involved Romero House
and the Canadian Romani Alliance. These not-for-profit organizations had
experience dealing with Hungarian Romani refugee claimants, including concerns
regarding quality of counsel. They argued that they were well-placed to provide
evidence about the particular vulnerabilities of Hungarian Romani clients and
the impact that poor quality legal services has had not just on individual clients

274. The Law Society of Upper Canada v Viktor Serhey Hohots (23 February 2015), Ontario, Law
Society Hearing Panel File No LCN22/14 (agreed statement of facts).
275. Ibid at para 12.
276. Ibid at para 18-27.
277. Law Society of Upper Canada v Hohots, 2015 ONLSTH 72.
278. Ibid at para 26.
279. Ibid at para 30.
280. The Law Society of Upper Canada v Viktor Serhey Hohots (1 May 2015), Ontario, Law Society
Tribunal Hearing Division File No LCN22/14 & LCN15/15 (notice of motion) (motion for
limited participation by Legal Aid Ontario).
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but on the Hungarian Romani community more generally. They also argued that
they could bring a human rights lens to the proceedings.281
The LSUC Tribunal denied these motions.282 The penalty hearing
proceeded—albeit with disruption when some advocates for refugees left the
hearing in protest.283 Ultimately, the LSUC Tribunal imposed a five-month
suspension on Hohots’s licence and a two-year prohibition on representing
refugee claimants. He was also required to pay a costs award.284 While counsel
for the LSUC suggested that the penalty was within the range applied in similar
cases, some advocates for refugees argued that the penalty was inadequate—and
that systemic changes are needed.285
As of the time of writing, the LSUC disciplinary proceedings involving
Elizabeth Jaszi286 and Joseph Farkas287 have not been finalized.

281. Law Society of Upper Canada v Viktor Serhey Hohots (1 May 2015), Ontario, Law Society
Tribunal Hearing Division File No LCN22/14 & LCN15/15 (notice of motion) (motion for
leave to intervene on behalf of Romero House and the Canadian Romani Alliance).
282. Maureen Brosnahan, “Toronto lawyer suspended for five months for misconduct
involving Roma refugees,” CBC News (12 May 2015), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/
toronto/toronto-lawyer-suspended-for-five-months-for-misconduct-involving-romarefugees-1.3071343>.
283. Rachel Mendleson, “Emotions run high at penalty hearing for disgraced refugee lawyer,”
Toronto Star (11 May 2015), online: <www.thestar.com/news/immigration/2015/05/11/
emotions-run-high-at-penalty-hearing-for-disgraced-refugee-lawyer.html>.
284. Ibid.
285. Ibid. See also Brosnahan, supra note 282.
286. Jaszi, supra note 248. According to media reports, Jaszi failed to attend the first day of
hearings and has thus been deemed to have admitted the facts submitted in the Notice
of Application. See Tali Folkins, “Another lawyer in hot water over services to refugee
claimants,” Law Times (22 June 2015), online: <www.lawtimesnews.com/201506224764/
headline-news/another-lawyer-in-hot-water-over-service-to-refugee-claimants>.
287. Farkas, supra note 249. As of the time of writing, the case has been heard, but no decision
has been issued.

